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This research examines advances in aviation technologies that allowed the 
Apache to become the world’s premier attack helicopter.  This is one of a series of 
research pieces, conducted under the auspices of an ongoing research effort sponsored by 
Headquarters U.S. Army Material Command.  The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile 
Command (AMCOM) has contracted with the University of Alabama in Huntsville 
(UAH) to do this research.  After all of the research is completed, the principal 
investigators at UAH and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) will do a 
crosscutting analysis across all the systems to identify key factors that can be used to 
guide future decision-making.  This thesis presents answers to a structured set of 
questions that address issues concerning outside influences, technology maturity and 
program management.  It evaluates the role of development and test strategies, and 
whether these have helped to create a functional system.  The research methodology is a 
Case Study, a limited number of questionnaires were sent to key personnel intimately 
involved with the program development.  This thesis provides the reader with a thorough 
understanding of how the history of Army aviation has evolved leading to the 
requirement for an attack helicopter on the modern battlefield.  The emphasis of this 
document is to follow a major weapon system through its lifecycle leading to successful 
deployment.  Lessons learned are presented in a clear concise manner addressing issues 
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This research examines advances in aviation technologies that allowed the 
Apache to become the world’s premier attack helicopter.  This thesis presents answers to 
a structured set of questions that address issues concerning outside influences, technology 
maturity and program management.  It evaluates the role of development and test 
strategies, and whether these have helped to create a functional system.  The research 
methodology is a Case Study.  The research findings and conclusions are primarily based 
on answers to questionnaires that were filled out by key personnel in the Government and 
contractor Apache Program Managers’ (PM) offices.  When required, the questionnaire 
results are supplemented with my research and interviews with key personnel.  I will 
complete a master questionnaire, address my research questions, and elicit relevant 
information to augment the answers to build the case study.  The title is: Case Study of 
the Development of the Apache Attack Helicopter (AH-64). 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
A long history of trial and error has led to the development of an aircraft that 
dominates the battlefield like no other system.  The highly integrated subsystems that 
makeup the AH-64 Apache allow it to evolve to fight in nearly any conditions.  However, 
the transition to an attack helicopter presence in the Army arsenal was not trouble-free.  
Obstacles to development of the Apache included service rivalries, funding cuts and 
cultural misunderstandings.  There are several key areas that led to the successful fielding 
and continued use of aviation firepower on the modern battlefield. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question: 
What were the key aspects of the Apache development that resulted in its 
successful employment in Desert Storm? 
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To what extent was there user support and funding stability during 
system development? 
To what extent did the maturity of critical technologies being 
integrated into the Apache influence the development?  How were the 
organizations that had developed the critical technologies involved 
during system development? 
Did the test strategy adequately evaluate the system for operational 
use? 
How effectively were teams employed during development? 




The scope of the thesis includes factors that influenced Apache development, and 
explores how well the system performed in Desert Storm.  It considers the critical 
technologies and how they were effectively implemented in this system.  The thesis 
explores the interrelationship of players such as users, government and contractor 
program managers, technology developers and testers and how they interacted in carrying 
out the development, production and fielding of the system. The research method is a 
case study, including questionnaires, interviews and supplemental research. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research consisted of the following steps: 
 
i. Identified key Government and Contractor Program Management 
personnel instrumental to the development process. 
ii. Sent questionnaires to key personnel.  
iii. Conducted a literature search of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM 
systems, Government reports, internet-based materials, and other 
library information resources. 
iv. Conducted interviews with key personnel. 
v. Analyzed this data. 
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vi. Data combined to form a single integrated master survey. 
Results from all survey questionnaires and research form the basis of the final 
written Case Study. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION  
 
Chapter II:  BACKGROUND History of Army Aviation as it relates to this thesis 
Overview of the Apache Attack Helicopter 
Chapter III:  DATA Present survey data and research data 
Chapter IV:  ANALYSIS Address research Questions  
Build a single overall survey 
Chapter V:  CONCLUSIONS Present conclusions and recommendations 
 
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This research studies the issues and relationships associated with the development 
of the Apache Attack Helicopter.  This case study is one of a series being prepared under 
an ongoing research effort sponsored by Headquarters U.S. Army Material Command.  
The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) has contracted with the 
University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH) to do this research.  After all of the Case 
Study research is completed, the Principal Investigators at UAH and Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) will do a crosscutting analysis across all the systems to 
identify key factors that can be used to guide future decision-making.  The case studies 
will be made available to the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and the Naval 



























Dateline: January 17, 1991 -- The largest military assault since D-Day began 
rather unceremoniously as eight Apache Attack Helicopters are led out into the desert by 
four Air Force MH-53J Pave Low Helicopters.  Dubbed Task Force Normandy, their 
mission, to open the door into Iraq, will signal the beginning of the Gulf War.  This 
mission would mark yet another success in the long history of Army aviation. 
Aviation has seen amazing evolutionary transformations, from the balloon 
outposts during the Civil War to the “flying tanks” of the Gulf War.  In order to gain a 
full understanding of this warfighting system, one must first look at the broad 
environment in which it operates.  This chapter will look at how the history of Army 
aviation has evolved and the nuances that have grown among the different services as 
well as those within the Department of the Army.  I will briefly discuss the history of 
Army Aviation and the socioeconomic and political forces that it has evolved around.  I 
will then lay out the Apache program time line, followed by a description of the aircraft 
system as it entered Desert Storm. 
 
 A. HISTORY OF AVIATION 
1. Balloon Corps  
The Union Army established the first “aviation unit” in the 1860’s during the 
Civil War.  Dubbed the “Balloon Corps of the Army of the Potomac”1, they used 
balloons to place observers above the battlefield to track enemy movement.  This gave 
the commander a distinct advantage in this war of positioning.  The Balloon Corps was 
later placed under the Signal Corps for the remainder of the war.  It appears that there 
was considerable distrust for this new technology and the men who risked their lives to 
make it work.  The Balloon Corps was disbanded shortly after the end of the war.  This 
marked the first of several shortsighted moves by the top brass to thwart Army Aviation 
in favor of ground troops. 
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Balloons were once again called into service in 1898 during the Spanish 
American War.  During the fighting, the first U.S. airman was shot down in combat as his 
balloon was hit by enemy fire.  Any hint of future Army aviation ended, as the balloons 
once again disappeared from the inventory at war’s end. 
Balloons have been used by the military since the turn of the century.  They have 
evolved from one-man observation posts to highly sophisticated surveillance platforms.  
Balloons have also been used to drop ordnance in times of war.  The use of balloons 
marked the unofficial beginning of Army aviation.  Throughout the early years, aviation 
remained a fairly mundane communication asset in the Signal Corps.  That was all to 
change with the onset of World War I. 
2. Aircraft  
On December 17, 1903, the first flight of a “heavier than air” craft took place at 
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.  The Wright brothers succeeded where many had failed and 
thus brought the world a little bit closer together.  By August 1907, the Army 
Aeronautical Division was established to promote the use of aircraft in the military.  In 
the fall of 1908, the Wright brothers build a “heavier than air flying machine”  in 
response to Signal Corps request for proposal (RFP).  During initial flight tests, Lt. 
Selfridge became the first aviation casualty, and the pilot, Orville Wright sustained severe 
injuries, as the plane they were riding in fell to the ground.  This event brought those 
opposed to aviation out of the woodwork.  Wilbur Wright quickly repaired the plane and 
resumed flight-testing.  He successfully demonstrated that the craft exceeded all Army 
requirements and Wright Brothers aircraft soon entered military service. 
As the fledgling aviation fleet began to evolve, a daring young Russian inventor, 
Igor Sikorsky, was trying to prove his helicopter design.  In 1909 Sikorsky got his craft 
off the ground, marking the first flight of a counter rotating, twin-bladed helicopter. 2  As 
WWI approached, Sikorsky was forced to concentrate his efforts on large military 
aircraft.  By 1914, he had created a four-engine aircraft capable of carrying one thousand 
pound bombs for the Russian Army.3  Meanwhile, back in the U.S., Congress officially 
created the Aviation Section within Signal Corps on July 18, 1914.  Aircraft were 
beginning to be used by the Allied forces in the war.  By May 1918, Congress saw the 
importance of aviation; through the Overman Act they formed the “Air Service”.  This 
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removed aviation assets from the Signal Corps, giving aviators more control over their 
own destiny.  However, just as aviation needed most to increase the research and 
development of this new technology, the war ended and defense funding was once again 
severely cut. 
As civil aviation boomed in the 1920’s and 1930’s, Army aviation tried to find 
itself.  In 1926 Congress established the Army Air Corps.  The Air Corps spent the next 
several years concentrating on large bombers; close air support was practically ignored.  
Military doctrine at the time was that the next war would be fought on the ground and 
from high in the air, and that air power was best used beyond the range of artillery.4  
Meanwhile, in May 1941, the first sustained flight of a Sikorsky V-300 helicopter took 
place. This aroused the Air Corps interest in helicopters and on 20 April 1942, Sikorsky 
delivered the first XR-4 helicopter to Army.   The R-4 was the first mass produced 
military helicopter.  They were used for observation, reconnaissance, and medical 
evacuation missions.  An Army R-4B was the first perform a military rescue behind 
enemy lines on April 25, 1944 in Burma.5 Between 1942 through 1946, the Army Air 
Force had purchased over 300 helicopters. However, combat usage of this unproven 
technology remained rather limited. 
Considerable changes hit the military when on 9 March 1942, Congress 
established three separate and coequal commands:  Army Ground Forces, Army Air 
Forces, and Army Service Forces.  This division of power was in its infancy as WW II 
raged on.  Then in the 1947 the National Defense Act, formally established the Air Force.  
The military chiefs met to carve up their missions.  The Army was forced to limit their 
fixed wing assets to less than five thousand pounds, while the Air Force would provide 
the necessary close air support.  This historic event forced the Army to develop helicopter 
fleets to compensate for the loss of its fixed wing support. 
The United States entered Korea with nearly the same sad state of readiness that 
they took into WW II.  The services had suffered from years of neglect at the hands of 
“downsizing” after the war.  The Air Force was mainly equipped to fight a nuclear war 
with heavy bombers.  Once the few significant targets were eliminated in Korea, the 
bombers had little impact.  Helicopter use was delegated to search and rescue missions as 
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the Army did their part from the air.    As the war raged on, Army H-13 helicopters, first 
fielded in 1951, were retrofitted with stretchers on their landing skids to transport the 
growing number of wounded to Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH).  By war’s 
end, over eighteen thousand wounded had been transported by H-13s.6  The civilian 
version of the H-19 Chickasaw was the world’s first transport helicopter.  Built by 
Sikorsky, the H-19 could carry six litters and one medical attendant during Medevac 
missions.  With seating for twelve, the Chickasaw was also used as a troop transport, 
utility carrier, and rescue helicopter.7  The success of the H-13 and H-19 in Korea helped 
the Army brass see the importance of the helicopter on the future battlefield. 
B. ATTACK HELICOPTERS: 
The use of force from the air dates back to the Balloon Corps and their limited 
attempts to arm aviators.  With their growing fleet of large aircraft, the Air Force quickly 
perfected aerial bombing techniques.  The Boeing B-17 “Flying Fortress” ushered in the 
use of an all around aerial attack with its various crew gun mounts and the ball-turret 
mounted beneath the huge slow aircraft.  Fighter aircraft were developed to help protect 
the bombers.  However, close air support was left largely to the different services and 
usually heroic individual efforts.  Backyard trial and error continued throughout WW I 
and WW II as ingenious aviators and mechanics attempted to arm their aircraft for battle.   
The Army Ground Forces Board at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, documented the 
first formal test of an armed helicopter on December 14, 1945.  The purpose of the test 
was to determine if a recoilless rifle could be mounted on a helicopter and fired in flight.  
Test results show that when fired, the backpressure of the 75mm rifle broke the Plexiglas 
windscreen and slightly buckled the tail cone of the test aircraft.  Lacking an adequate 
means of sighting the gun, the testing was halted.  Helicopter armament was brought to a 
standstill for the next several years as the fledgling helicopter industry grew.   
Meanwhile, the Air Force continued to concentrate on fixed wing assets and nuclear war. 
The Army used lessons learned from the Korean conflict to boost their helicopter 
transport fleet.  When the Army entered Vietnam, the need for close air support quickly 
became a priority.  The entire helicopter fleet came under enemy fire; it wasn’t long 
before the need for aerial defense was realized.  The Army relied on it’s aging fleet of 
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CH-21 Shawnee tandem rotor helicopters as flying trucks.  Dubbed the “flying banana”, 
this was the first true multi-mission helicopter, utilizing wheels, skis or floats for 
different terrains.  Shawnee was the fourth of a line of tandem rotor helicopters designed 
by Piasecki.  The slow, CH-21’s were sitting ducks for enemy fire, one was even rumored 
to be brought down with a Viet Cong spear.8  The CH-21’s were soon outfitted with guns 
in the doorways and on the skids.  Several different gun experiments took place in the 
early 1960’s.  Some Shawnees were equipped with movable nose guns.  The Army even 
attempted to mount a B-29 Superfortress ball-turret beneath a CH-21, but this experiment 
was quickly discarded as the forces of the blast damaged the test aircraft.  The Shawnee 
remained the workhorse of the Army through the early years of Vietnam.  Use of the CH-
21 ended with the arrival of the UH-1 Huey and the CH-47 Chinook to the battlefield. 
 
Figure 1.   Test of .50 cal Guns on CH-21 Shawnee (1962) 
 
Bell Helicopter’s UH-1 Iroquois was a result of an Army request for a general 
utility helicopter.  Bell began development of the prototype in 1955 to meet the Army 
specification.  The Huey as it was called after it's original model designation, the HU-1, 
was essentially a stretched Bell model 47 Sioux with room for seven troops or three 
stretchers in it's cargo compartment behind the pilot. As Huey’s entered service in 
Vietnam they were first armed with two door guns.   
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Figure 2.   Huey Door Mounted Machine Gun 
The CH-47 Chinook tandem rotor helicopter was developed in the late 1950’s in 
order to meet increased demand for an all-weather heavy cargo carrier.  The YCH-47A 
made its initial flight on 21 September 1961 and was fielded to Vietnam in the mid 
1960’s.9  In an experimental project, Boeing Vertol equipped four Chinooks with five 
machine guns, two 20 mm cannons, two rocket launchers and a “chin-mounted” grenade 
launcher.10  Designated “Guns-A-Go-Go” these heavily armored aircraft, each with a 
crew of eight, entered service in late 1965.  The aircraft proved highly effective clearing 
landing zones and in assault missions.  Each aircraft was capable of carrying a ton of 
expendable munitions.  However, they were difficult to maintain and following a number 
of accidents, the effort was terminated in 1967 with the introduction of the AH-1 Cobra. 
 
Figure 3.   Heavily Armed “Guns-a-Go-Go” Chinook 
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As the war raged on in Vietnam, the Army realized the need to control it's own 
close air support.  In June 1963, the Army issued a request for proposal (RFP) for the 
Advanced Aerial Fire Support System (AAFSS).  A competition pitted the traditional 
helicopter builders Sikorsky and Bell versus Lockheed, a newcomer to the helicopter 
trade but with considerable fixed wing experience.  Bell entered a scaled-down version of 
it's Iroquois Warrior.  The other competitor was the Sikorsky S-66.  The Sikorsky design 
had a rotorprop tail rotor which could rotate on it's axis 90° to act both as an anti-torque 
rotor or as a pusher, thereby transforming the S-66 into a compound aircraft in cruising 
flight.  The Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne won the competition. 
On May 3, 1967, the first prototype YAH-56 Cheyenne rolled out of the 
Lockheed facility.  The futuristic design had exceeded Army expectations.  The 
Cheyenne had a single rigid four-bladed main rotor and anti-torque tail rotor, and a three-
bladed pusher.  The 
radical design of the 
Cheyenne helped it to 
reach an astonishing 
speed of 256 miles per 
hour, over twice the top 
speed of a UH-1.  The 
rigid-rotor Cheyenne, 
with a crew of two, had a 
swiveling gunner's 
station linked to rotating 
belly and nose turrets, 
and a laser range-finder tied to a fire control computer.  It was armed with a 30mm 
automatic gun in the belly turret and a 40mm grenade launcher or a 7.62mm Gatling 
machine gun in the chin-turret, TOWs, and 2.75 inch rocket launchers.  The turret guns 
were slaved to the pilot’s or copilot’s helmet sight, this allowed them to aim and fire by 
simply turning their head.  The age of the attack helicopter had arrived.  However, as 
requirements creep set in, the Cheyenne became even more complex, expensive and 
worst of all, behind schedule. 
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The Army had an immediate need for firepower in Vietnam and top brass were 
impatient with the slow progress of the Cheyenne.  By January 1965, the Army released a 
RFP for an interim Attack Helicopter, “escort gunship”.  Three systems competed for the 
contract, the Sikorsky Sea King, Kaman Seasprite and Bell Cobra.  Bell won the flyoff 
and by October 1967, the first Cobra missions were flown in Vietnam.  As the world’s 
first attack helicopter, the Cobra’s mission was direct fire support, armed escort and 
reconnaissance.  It was armed with a 40 mm grenade launcher, 7.62 mm “minigun” and 
2.75-inch rocket launchers.  The Viet Cong named the Cobra “Whispering Death”. 
 
Figure 4.   AH-1 Cobra Gun Ship 
 
Stateside attention turned once again to the struggling Cheyenne program.  
Rollout of Lockheed’s first prototype YAH-56 Cheyenne took place on May 3, 1967.  
The Air Force saw the Cheyenne as a threat to its close air, anti-tank mission.  Secretary 
of the Air Force Harold Brown ordered the development of the A-10 Warthog to meet 
that need.  As the Cheyenne continued to have technical problems, the Cobra was proving 
itself in battle.  The Army soon realized that they would not win a turf war with the Air 
Force.  With the A-10 project in full swing, the Army decided that they wanted a smaller, 
more agile Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) with a less complicated fire control and 
navigation system.  The Cheyenne contract was terminated in May 1969.  Through this 
period, the Army continued to desire fixed-wing close air support (CAS) from the Air 
Force.  To that end, it was, relatively easy for the two services to agree that the attack 
helicopter did not perform CAS.  Instead, it was an extension of organic firepower, and 
the Air Force would continue to provide CAS with fixed-wing aircraft.  The two services 
agreed to consider the two types of aircraft as complementary rather than duplicative. 
Since that time, there have been no serious disagreements over aviation missions and 
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functions between the Army and the Air Force.  The new helicopter's mission would 
eventually be filled by the AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter. 
C. APACHE ATTACK HELICOPTER 
The McDonnell Douglas (formally Hughes) AH-64 Apache is a twin-engine 
rotary wing aircraft, designed as a stable, manned aerial weapon system.  With its two 
pilots and sophisticated computers, the Apache is capable of defeating a wide range of 
targets, including armored vehicles.  It is capable of performing missions, day or night in 
adverse weather conditions.  Combined with the integrated Target Acquisition 
Designation Sight / Pilot Night Vision Sensor (TADS/PNVS), the platform provides day 
and night acquisition and designation of targets and hand-off capabilities in support of 
Hellfire and other guided munitions.  Aircraft armament includes the Hellfire anti-tank 
missile system, 30mm automatic chain gun and 2.75” rockets.  The platform has a full 
range of aircraft survivability equipment with the ability to withstand hits from rounds up 
to 23mm in critical areas.  Powered by two General Electric gas turbine engines, the 
Apache can cruise at an airspeed of 145 mph with a flight endurance of over three hours.  
The AH-64 is transportable in the C-5, C141 and C-17.  The Apache Attack Helicopter 
contributes a highly mobile and effective firepower asset to the anti-armor capability in 
the field.  The Apache development time line is depicted in figure 6, this chart was built 
from information contained in a number of sources11 12 13.   
 




D. DESERT STORM 
In the early morning of 17 January 1991, an Army aviator fired the first shot of 
Operation Desert Storm from an Apache helicopter.  Within a few minutes, two teams of 





Figure 6.   Apache Armaments 
 
During the 100-hour ground war, Army attack helicopters played their most 
decisive role ever in combat.  Whatever doubts remained regarding combat effectiveness 
of attack helicopters were quickly dispelled.  In addition to the attack role, helicopters 
were used for air assault, reconnaissance, transportation, combat search and rescue, and 
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observation.  Dozens of aviation units and several hundred helicopters of all types took 




Wing Span 17.15 ft 
Primary Mission 
Gross Weight 15,075 lb 
Standard Day Hot Day 
Hover In-Ground Effect 15,895 ft 14,845 ft 
Hover Out-of-Ground Effect 12,685 ft 11,215 ft 
Vertical Rate of Climb 2,175 fpm 2,050 fpm 
Maximum Rate of Climb 2,915 fpm 2,890 fpm 
Maximum Level Flight Speed 150 kt 153 kt 
Cruise Speed 150 kt 153 kt 
 
Figure 7.   AH-64A Specifications 
 
Helicopters, as well as most other types of equipment, were adversely affected by 
sand and other environmental conditions; however, methods were devised to control the 
damage and to maintain a high rate of combat readiness.  Operation Desert Storm was the 
first major military operation conducted on a largely electronic battlefield.  Army 
aviation amply demonstrated its effectiveness in this environment and also proved again 
that it could “own the night” by carrying out many of its combat operations during 
darkness.  
The reason that the Apache strike force team needed four Air Force MH-53J Pave 
Low helicopters to help start the Gulf War was that the Apaches needed to follow the 
Pave Lows into the desert due to the Apache’s lack of adequate navigation equipment 
capable of traversing the flat, featureless Mid Eastern terrain.  The Apache is a system 
that continues to evolve; even today there are deficiencies and shortcomings that are 
being addressed. 
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Since Desert Storm, Army aviation has taken part in several other operations: 
Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, Restore/Continue Hope in Somalia, Uphold 
Democracy in Haiti, and the NATO operation in Bosnia.  Aviation still continues to 
evolve, and Somalia provided important lessons learned relating to military operations in 
an urban environment.  With the firepower of the Apache, Army aviation continues to 
demonstrate its unique worldwide capability through a combination of versatility, 
deployability, and lethality.  The Apache’s ability to evolve allows it to be an important 
ingredient of almost any type of contingency operation anywhere in the world.  
16 
 1970 AAH work begun 
 
January – August  1972:  Marks Board formed, mission: To study requirements for an 
attack helicopter (Chartered to: “Revalidate the Advanced Aerial Fire Support System 
Qualitative Material Requirement”) 
 
September 1972: AAH Material Need approved 
 
November 1972:  AAH RFP released 
 
February 1973: RFP responded to by 5 companies 
  (Sikorsky, Boeing-Vertol, Bell Helicopter, Hughes, and Lockheed) 
 
April 1973:  AAH PMO stood-up (BG Samuel G. Cockerham, 1st PM) 
 
June 1973:  Down select to competitive development with Hughes and Bell Helicopter 
 
September 1975:  First flight, Bell’s YAH-63A & Hughes’ YAH-64A 
 
April 1976:  New AAH PM (MG Edward M. Browne, April 1976 – December 1982) 
 
June 1976:  Prototypes delivered to Army for flyoff 
 
December 10, 1976: Down select to Hughes YAH-64A 
 
June 1981:  Operational Test (OT II) @ Hunter Liggett (Ft. Ord, CA) 
 
FY 1982:  Congress approves LRIP, $444.5 M Contract for 11 aircraft 
 
November 1982:  Hughes completes $300 M AAH production facility in Mesa, AZ 
 
November 1982:  $106 Million low rate production contract for 48 aircraft 
 
September 30, 1983:  First production aircraft complete 
 
December 30, 1983:  Hughes Helicopter Company sold to McDonnell Douglas Corp 
 
Spring 1984: $841Million production contract for 112 aircraft 
 

































A. DATA COLLECTION 
My primary research question is: “What were the key aspects of the Apache 
development that resulted in its successful employment in Desert Storm?”  This question 
will be addressed by looking at a series of secondary questions.  In order to answer these 
questions, data has been collected in a structured combination of “system” information 
and “technology” information.  To facilitate the collection of data, I used a survey 
developed by a research team lead by The University of Alabama in Huntsville Research 
Institute and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management an 
example of a completed survey can be found in Appendix C. 
The research methodology is a case study.  As such, surveys were sent to a very 
small number of people intimately involved with the development and production of the 
Apache Helicopter.  The study must be done now because many of the men and women 
responsible for the development and eventual fielding of this weapon system are retiring, 
taking with them important knowledge that should be captured and codified into practical 
lessons for the future.  The data has been collected from both a Government and a 
contractor Program Management team member.  Responses from survey questions 
relevant to each of my research topics are organized below.  This chapter is non-
traditional, but that it will provide the foundation for my analysis and a combined survey 
for the research team. 
The unique numbering system from the survey is maintained for reference and 
organizational purposes.  The questions are organized by topic, the major phases of the 
program are defined as follows:  The survey is centered around three phases in a major 
program.  First is the systems planning and pre-development phase, “SP”, this is the stage 
where planning work began on the integrated system.  Systems planning ended when 
contractors were selected for the development phase.  The second stage is the 
development phase, “D”, in this phase contractors performed advanced engineering and 
development.  A fly-off occurred in the development phase with the winner moving on to 
operational test.  The third stage is referred to as transition to production, “TP”, this is 
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when a producible system prototype has been demonstrated in an operational 
environment and is ready for low rate initial production.  Questions are also divided into 
the following categories as defined by the first letter in the question: 
• “T” stands for Technology 
• “H” stands for project History 
• “V” stands for Validation activities: testing and simulation 
• “D” stands for team participants and communications during Development 
• “F” stands for activity report during system development stage of the 
project 
• “W” stands for When activity phasing occurred by stages of development 
and transition 
• “B” stands for problem solving and team effort 
• “O” stands for project Outcomes 
 
The definitions of the various organizations of interest used throughout the 
document are defined in Table 1. Scales used for Technology and Production Readiness 
are defined in figures 9 and 10 respectively. 
Prime’s S&T org. The Science and Technology group within system prime 
contractors organization responsible for doing internal research 
and development (IR&D) and developing new technology and 
concepts 
Other prime org. Any prime contractor organization other than the S&T 
organization 
Supplier S&T Same definition as for prime’s S&T organization, but located at a 
supplier. 
Other supplier org. Any supplier organization other than the S&T organization. 
Army Lab/Center One or more of the Army laboratories or research, development 
and engineering centers. 
Other DoD/S&T org. An equivalent of an Army Lab/Center found elsewhere in DoD. 
Table 1.   Organization Definitions 
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 B. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 1:  USER SUPPORT AND FUNDING 
“To what extent was there user support and funding stability during system 
development?” 
This question will be addressed by looking at the role of the user, requirements 
and funding stability.  Information for user support comes from survey questions D18, 
F5, F6, W3, W4, and W5, requirements stability from F7, W6 and B13, and funding 
stability from questions H1, D11 and B2. 
User support, survey questions D18, F5, F6, W3 through W5 
D18.  There was a lot of contact with Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and/or 
other appropriate user representatives during the project? 
Government Answer:  Strongly Agree. 
Contractor Answer:  Somewhat Agree. 
 
How often did the following occur during Development?  (F5 & F6) 
F5. Did TRADOC/other user organizations show strong support? 
Government Answer:  Many Times. 
Contractor Answer:  Don’t know. 
 
F6. Were there changes in key TRADOC or other user personnel? 
Government Answer:  Several Times. 
Contractor Answer:  Don’t know. 
 
ACTIVITY PHASING BY STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION 
When did the team carry out the following activities? 
 
W3. When was the TRADOC consulted on project questions? 
Government Answer:  Selection, between system planning phase and 
development phase. 
Contractor Answer:  Later Development, between development phase and 
transition to production phase. 
21 
W4. When was there change in key TRADOC/user representatives? 
Government Answer:  Early Development, between development and transition to 
production. 
Contractor Answer:  Do not know. 
W5. When did TRADOC/other users show strong support? 
Government Answer:  Middle Development, between development and transition 
to production. 
Contractor Answer:  Transition, after transition to production.  
 
Requirements stability:  Survey questions F7, W6 and B13 
F7. Were there changes in system requirements (e.g., threat)? 
Government Answer:  Several times. 
Contractor Answer:  Do not know. 
W6. When was there change in the system requirements? 
Government Answer:  After development. 
Contractor Answer:  Do not know. 
B13. Did this problem come up during this project?  Threat definition or other 
requirements changed during the project. 
Government Answer:  Significant effort spent on this problem. 
Contractor Answer:  Do not know. 
 
Funding stability:  Survey questions H1, D11 and B2 
H1.  At some point, was the project either:  1. Slowed down?  2. Stopped and restarted?   
3. Neither.  
Government Answer:  1.  Slowed down, due to funding cuts. 




D11.  There was often uncertainty about the future of project funding during the System 
Development stage? 
Government Answer:  Agree somewhat, the funding changes were a constant 
concern to the PMO, this caused the staff to be concerned at each major milestone. 
Contractor Answer:  Disagree somewhat, some uncertainty existed, but we were 
confident that the system filled a need. 
B2. Did this problem come up during this project?  Cut-backs in project resources forced 
changes/compromises. 
Government Answer:  Major effort spent on this problem. 
Contractor Answer:  Minor effort spent on this problem. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 2:  CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES 
“To what extent did the maturity of critical technologies being integrated into the 
Apache influence development?  How were the organizations that had developed the 
critical technologies involved during system development?”  
This question will be addressed by looking at three critical technologies, central to 
the success of the developed for the Apache, in terms of technology readiness, the project 
timeline and project outcomes.  Information for critical technologies comes from survey 
question T1, technology readiness, from survey questions on systems planning “S”, 
development “D”, transition to production “TP”, and T5 through T7, and project 
outcomes from survey questions O1 through O9.   
The second question will be addressed by looking at the involvement of 
development organizations throughout system development.  Survey data includes, the 
role of the S&T organizations, integration difficulties, production readiness, the role of 
the prime contractor, and problem identification.  The role of the S&T organizations 
comes from survey questions on page 1 and T8 through T10.  Difficulties integrating 
technologies are addressed in survey questions T3, H3, B1, B4 through B8.  While 
production readiness issues are in survey questions on page 1, T3, H6, B4 through B6 and 
B8. 
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 Identify critical technologies: Survey question T1.  
Now identify one or more (up to 3) technologies that were incorporated into the 
system you are studying.  These technologies should be among those central to the 
success of the system. 
 
 Government response: 
Technology A   Visionics 
Technology B   Computers 
Technology C   Avionics 
 Contractor response: 
Technology A   Target Acquisition/Designation (TADS) 
Technology B   Forward Looking Infrared System  (FLIRS) 
Technology C   Hellfire Missile Integration (Laser) 
 
Table 2.   Critical Technologies Response 
 
NOTE:  There were many new and critical technologies incorporated into the Apache.  In 
order to compare answers, participants were asked to respond to a single set of critical 
technologies.  Surveys were repeated for the three technologies in the table below. 
 
Technology A   Target Acquisition/Designation (TADS/PNVS) 
Technology B   Computers 
Technology C   Avionics 
 
Table 3.   Critical Technologies Evaluated 
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Technology readiness: Survey questions SP, D, TP, and T5 through T7 
SP. What was the approximate starting date of systems planning and pre-development 
work?  This date is when planning work began on the integrated system.  The systems 
concept and applications had been formulated, but applications were still speculative.  
There was no proof or detailed analysis to support the approach. 
 
SP:  SYSTEMS PLANNING START DATE (SP):   
 Government Answer:  Cheyenne Development effort, begun in 1963, preceded 
Apache Development/Planning work begun approximately 09/69 (mo/yr).  Much of this 
work helped jump-start the AAH program. 
 Contractor Answer:  Approximately 1974. 
 
SP.  In what organization was the primary work leading up to this point accomplished? 
Government Answer:  CHEYENNE PM, with lead support from TRADOC. 
Contractor Answer: Prime’s S&T organization.  
 
SP.  Including that organization, what organizations had been involved up to this point? 
Government Answer:  Active support from both other prime organizations and 
other supplier organizations. 
Contractor Answer:  Lead/co-lead from other prime organizations.  Active 
support from supplier S&T organizations, the Army lab centers, and other DoD/S&T 
organizations. 
 
SP.  What was the nature of the Army lab center’s involvement? (Simulation? Concept 
formulation?  Integration? Requirements development?)   
Government Answer: Most of the behind the scene “effort” was competing 
contractors (Bell and Sikorsky), supporting their King Cobra and S-67 as replacement for 
the LOCKHEED CHEYENNE while supporting termination of the CHEYENNE 
Production contract as well as the eventual development contract.  Definition of the 
Advanced Attack Helicopter was centered around what the Department of Army thought 
Bell Helicopter was capable of producing. 
Contractor Answer:  Did not know. 
 
D.  Date when Development started. Typically at this date, funding started for system 
advanced development or engineering development, a Government project office was 
formed and prime contractor(s) selected. 
Government Answer:  DEVELOPMENT START DATE: (D):  June 1973.  
 Contractor Answer:  DEVELOPMENT START DATE: (D):  1976. 
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 D.  What was the Technology Readiness Level (refer to page 8) for the SYSTEM on this 
date?  
Government Answer:  6.  System/subsystem model or prototypes were 
demonstrated in a relevant environment.  Representative model or prototype systems 
were tested, which is well beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated readiness. 
Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity laboratory environment or in a 
simulated operational environment. 
 Contractor Answer:  3.  The system is in the analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept stage.  Analytical and laboratory studies 
have physically validated analytic predictions of separate elements of the technology.  
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative. 
 
D.  What was the Production Readiness Level (refer to page 8) for the SYSTEM on this 
date?  
Government Answer:  2.  The application is produced outside the lab with tools 
and processes used for producing very low quantities. 
Contractor Answer:  2.  The application is produced outside the lab with tools and 
processes used for producing very low quantities. 
 
D.  In what organization was the primary work in the period from systems planning to 
development accomplished?   
Government Answer:  Primary work was accomplished in the Project 
Management office. 
 Contractor Answer:  Primary work was accomplished in the primes science and 
technology organization. 
 
D.  Including that organization, what organizations had been involved in the period 
systems planning to development? 
Government Answer:  Involved – Other prime organizations.  Kept informed – 
Army lab center and other DoD/S&T organizations.  Not Involved – Primes S&T 
organization, supplier S&T, and “other supplier organizations. 
Contractor Answer:  Lead/co-lead - Other prime organization and supplier S&T 





D.  What was the nature of the Army Lab/Center’s involvement? (Engineering support? 
Simulation or testing?  Integration? Requirements interpretation?)   
Government Answer:  Technical consultation. The Night Vision Lab was the lead 
support for the TADS/PNVS. 
Contractor Answer:  Engineering support. 
 
TP.  Date the system started transition to production “TP”.  This is when the producible 
system prototype has been demonstrated in an operational environment.  
Government Answer: TRANSITION TO PRODUCTION (TP) DATE: Apr 1982. 
Contractor Answer: TRANSITION TO PRODUCTION (TP) DATE:  1980. 
 
TP. What was the Production Readiness Level for the SYSTEM on this date? 
 Government Answer:  3.   
 Contractor Answer:  4.  
 
TP.  In what organization was the primary work in the period from development to 
transition to production accomplished?   
 Government Answer:  Program Management. 
Contractor Answer:  Prime S&T organization. 
 
TP.  Including that organization, what organizations had been involved in the period 
development to transition to production? 
Government Answer:  Lead/co-lead – Prime S&T organization and other prime 
organizations.  Active support - Supplier S&T organization.  Involved - Other supplier 
organizations, the Army lab center, and other DoD/S&T organizations. 
Contractor Answer:  Lead/co-lead - Other prime organizations and supplier S&T 
organizations.  Active support -  Army lab center. 
 
TP.  What was the nature of the Army Lab Center’s involvement? (Engineering support?  
Simulation or testing?  Integration? Requirements interpretation?)   
 Government Answer:  Simulation. 
Contractor Answer:  Engineering Support; Requirements Definition. 
 
Now look at the SP, D, and TP dates you provided above for the System.  Using the 
Technology Readiness (TRL) Scale (see end of this chapter), find the number that 
represents the readiness of the separate technologies the team was working with at each 
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point in time.  Please answer here for the state of development of each component 






B    
Computers 
Technology 
C      
Avionics 
Government response:    
T5. When System planning and pre-
development began, technology TRL was: 
2 3 7 
T6. When System went into Development, 
technology TRL was: 
3 3 7 
T7. When System reached Transition to 
Production, technology TRL was: 
8 9 9 
Contractor response:    
T5. When System planning and pre-
development began, technology TRL was: 
2 2 6 
T6. When System went into Development, 
technology TRL was: 
4 7 7 
T7. When System reached Transition to 
Production, technology TRL was: 
8 8 8 
 
Table 4.   Technology Readiness 
 
 
Project Outcomes:  Survey questions O1 through O9 
 
 O1. Project Acceptance.  Was the SYSTEM accepted to be put into production?  This is 
initial acceptance, not whether it actually ended up in production.   
Government Answer:  3. Yes, the System was accepted for production. 
Contractor Answer:  3. Yes, the System was accepted for production. 
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O2. After the SYSTEM was accepted and was in Transition to Production, how many 
additional changes in the designs and processes were later required before the System 
was taken into full production? 
Government Answer:  2. Significant changes were made. 
 Contractor Answer:  3. Minor changes were made. 
 
O3. Did the SYSTEM go into full production? 
Government Answer:  3. Yes, the System was put into full production. 
Contractor Answer:  3. Yes, the System was put into full production. 
 
O4. For each of the technologies A, B, and C above, to what extent was each used in the 
system as it was produced? 
 






Government response:    
4. Yes, the technology was used 
as planned.  
X X X 
Contractor response:    
4. Yes, the technology was used 
as planned.  
X X X 
 
Table 5.   Technology Usage 
 
 
O5. After the SYSTEM reached Transition to Production, did the project go to 
production as quickly as it should have?    
Government Answer:  2. One to six months delay  





O6. After the SYSTEM was actually in production, how many additional changes in 
designs and processes were required?  
Government Answer:  2. Significant changes. 
Contractor Answer:  3. Minor changes. 
 
O7.  Did the SYSTEM as it was implemented meet the program’s cost goals?   
Government Answer:  2. The results came close to achieving cost goals. 
Contractor Answer:  2. The results came close to achieving cost goals. 
 
O8.  Did the System Development program, as implemented, come in on budget? 
Government Answer:  3. The project significantly exceeded budget. 
Contractor Answer:  9. Don’t know. 
 
O9. Did the System as it was implemented meet the project’s technical goals and 
functional requirements? 
Government Answer:  1.  The results met or exceeded technical goals. 
Contractor Answer:  1.  The results met or exceeded technical goals. 
 
O9x. Did the System have problems in the field under operational conditions in Desert 
Storm?  IF YOU CHECKED “1” or “2”, what did the field problems result from?  Check 
all that apply. 
Government Answer:  2. Yes, problems in the field caused minor problems in the 
system’s effectiveness.  9b. Requirements did not reflect the field environment. 
Contractor Answer: 4. No, the system was deployed and exceeded expectations of 
its effectiveness. 
 
Role of the S&T organizations: Survey questions page 1 (addressed above), 







For each of the technologies A, B & C, did 
an Army Laboratory or Center make a 
significant contribution to achieving any 














Government response:    
T9.  Yes, it contributed to Readiness for 
Development. 
X  X 
T10. Yes, it contributed to Readiness for 
Transition to Production. 
 X  
Contractor response:    
T8.  Yes, it contributed to Readiness at start 
of Planning/Pre-development. 
X X X 
T9.  Yes, it contributed to Readiness for 
Development. 
X X X 
T10. Yes, it contributed to Readiness for 
Transition to Production. 
X X X 
    
 
Table 6.   Army Lab or Center Involvement 
 
B11. Army Labs/Centers resisted project ideas or approaches. Did this problem come up 
during this project?  IF YES, how much project effort had to be spent on this problem? 
Government Answer:  Yes, minor effort. 




Difficulties integrating technologies:  Survey questions T3, H3, B1, B4 
through B8 
T3. Production Impact. What was 
the impact of the technology on 
then existing production processes? 
(Answer for date you provided for 







Government response:    
Technology forced deep and serious 
production process change. 
X X X 
Contractor response:    
Technology caused significant 
production process change. 
X X  
Technology did not require much 
production process change 
  X 
 
Table 7.   Production Impact of Critical Technology 
 
H3. Key Skills.  This question asks about “key skills” essential to the success of the 
project, defined as skills “that if they were not available at all, would have stopped team 
progress at the point when they were needed.”  Were there any key skills not adequately 
represented on the team?  IF YES, what were the missing key skills?  Please check ( 9 ) 
any and all that apply. 
Government Answer:  Yes, more than one.  The team lacked producibility 
professionals from suppliers and Government logistics experts. 
Contractor Answer:  No. 
 
For the following questions, did this problem come up during this project?  IF YES, how 
much project effort had to be spent on this problem? 
B1.  It was harder than expected to take the risk out of the new technology. 
Government Answer:  No, much to the risk areas had been identified. 
Contractor Answer:  Minor effort. 
 
B4.  A critical production issue was uncovered very late in the process. 
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Government Answer:  Significant effort. 
Contractor Answer:  Minor effort. 
B5.  Management pressure pushed technology prematurely into production. 
Government Answer:  Major effort. 
Contractor Answer:  No. 
B6.  There was a lack of acceptance standards for the new technology. 
Government Answer:  Minor effort. 
Contractor Answer:  No. 
B7.  The technology was hard to scale up from lab and pilot tests. 
Government Answer:  Minor effort. 
Contractor Answer:  Minor effort. 
B8. Testing, quality control and/or acceptance took longer than planned. 
Government Answer:  Significant effort. 
Contractor Answer:  Minor effort. 
 
Production Readiness:  Survey questions Page1 (addressed above), T3, H6, B4 
through B6 and B8 
 
T3.  Production Impact. What was the impact of the technology on then existing 
production processes? (These results are in Table 6 above.) 
 
H6.  Whose facilities were going to be the primary production site for the application of 
the new technologies?  
Government Answer:  3. Supplier facilities. 
Contractor Answer:  2. Both prime and supplier facilities. 
 
For the following questions, did this problem come up during this project?  IF Yes, how 
much project effort had to be spent on this problem? 
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 B4.  A critical production issue was uncovered very late in the process. 
Government Answer:  Yes, significant effort had to be spent on this problem. 
Contractor Answer:  Yes, minor effort had to be spent on this problem. 
B5.  Management pressure pushed technology prematurely into production. 
Government Answer:  Yes, major effort had to be spent on this problem. 
Contractor Answer:  No. 
B6.  There was a lack of acceptance standards for the new technology. 
Government Answer:  Yes, minor effort had to be spent on this problem. 
Contractor Answer:  No. 
B8.  Testing, quality control and/or acceptance took longer than planned. 
Government Answer:  Yes, significant effort had to be spent on this problem. 
Contractor Answer:  Yes, minor effort had to be spent on this problem. 
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 3:  TEST STRATEGY 
“Did the test strategy adequately evaluate the system for operational use?”  This 
question will be addressed by looking at the test approach utilized supplemented with 
data from program files and test reports.  The test approach is covered in survey questions 
V1 through V15. 
 
Identify test approach:  Survey questions V1 through V15 
 
V1.  Was a failure modes and effects analysis done on the system? If yes, was it used to 
help establish the test plan? 
Government Answer:  Yes.  Yes, it was used to help establish the test plan. 
Contractor Answer:  Yes.  Don’t know. 
 
These questions are for individual components: 
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V2.  Was there testing to see if the individual components of the system worked?  What 
organization(s) did this testing?  
Government Answer:  Yes.  Prime and Suppliers did this testing. 
Contractor Answer:  Yes.  Prime, Suppliers and Army center/lab did this testing. 
V3.  Were there simulations run to see if the individual components of the system 
worked?  What organization(s) did these simulations? 
Government Answer:  Yes, Prime, suppliers and Army center lab did these 
simulations. 
Contractor Answer:  Yes, Prime and suppliers did these simulations. 
 
For integrated components in controlled setting: 
V4.  Were the components tested working together in a controlled setting?  What 
organization(s) did this testing?  
Government Answer:  Yes.  Prime, Suppliers and Army center/lab did this testing. 
Contractor Answer:  Yes.  Prime and Suppliers did this testing. 
 
V5.  Were there simulations of the components working together in a controlled setting? 
What organization(s) did this?  
Government Answer:  Yes.  Prime, Suppliers and to limited degree, the Army 
center lab performed simulations.  
Contractor Answer:  Yes.  Prime and Suppliers performed simulations. 
 
For integrated components in a realistic setting: 
V6.  Was there testing of the components working together in a realistic setting?  What 
organization(s) did this testing? 
Government Answer:  Yes.  The prime, suppliers and the Army lab center 
performed testing in a realistic environment. 
Contractor Answer:  Yes.  The prime and other Government organizations 
performed testing in a realistic environment. 
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V7.  Was a hardware-in-the-loop type systems integration simulation laboratory used to 
see if the individual components of the system worked?  To see if integrated 
components worked in controlled setting? 
Government Answer:  Yes / Yes. 
Contractor Answer:  Yes / Yes. 
V8.  Recalling the total effort (100%) spent on testing and simulations, please allocate the 
percent of that total that were:  
 
Gov  /  Cont (Contractor had no response) 
10  /   % spent to see if the individual components of the system worked. 
65  / % spent to see if integrated components worked in controlled setting. 
20  / % spent to see if integrated components worked in a realistic setting. 
05  / % spent on any other validation purpose. 
 
Please evaluate the following statements about the use of testing and simulations: 
V9.  Knowledge from validation work was used consistently to improve components and 
system. 
Government Answer:  Neither agree nor disagree. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
V10.  Project test philosophy was to “Break it big early.” 
Government Answer:  Strongly disagree. 
Contractor Answer:  Neither agree nor disagree. 
V11.  Component and system maturity were validated at the right times in the program. 
Government Answer:  Disagree somewhat. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
V12.  The project and the testing community had an adversarial relationship. 
Government Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
Contractor Answer:  Strongly disagree. 
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V13.  Most project validation events produced quality results. 
Government Answer:  Disagree somewhat. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
V14.  The project didn’t recognize important lessons that validation work uncovered. 
Government Answer:  Neither agree nor disagree. 
Contractor Answer:  Disagree somewhat. 
V15.  Sometimes the project settled for less than the best validation method. 
Government Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
Contractor Answer:  Disagree somewhat. 
O3. Did the SYSTEM go into full production? 
Government Answer:  3. Yes, the System was put into full production. 
Contractor Answer:  3. Yes, the System was put into full production. 
O5. After the SYSTEM reached Transition to Production, did the project go to 
production as quickly as it should have?    
Government Answer:  2. One to six months delay  
Contractor Answer:  2. One to six months delay 
O9x. Did the System have problems in the field under operational conditions in Desert 
Storm?  IF YOU CHECKED “1” or “2”, what did the field problems result from?  Check 
all that apply. 
Government Answer:  2. Yes, problems in the field caused minor problems in the 
system’s effectiveness.  9b. Requirements did not reflect the field environment. 
Contractor Answer: 4. No, the system was deployed and exceeded expectations of its 
effectiveness. 
 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 4:  TEAMS 
“How effectively were teams employed during development?”  This question will 
be addressed by looking at the effectiveness of teams, proper staffing, and relationships 
between manufacturing and suppliers.  Teaming approach utilized is addressed in survey 
questions H2, H4, H5, D1, D7, D9, D13, D14, D16, D19, and F4. 
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Teaming approach utilized:  Survey questions H2, H4, H5, D7, D9, D13, D14, 
D16, D19, and F4 
H2.  Was the project set up as a cross-functional integrated product team (IPT), a project 
team drawn from different parts of the contractor’s organization with most of the skills 
needed for the development?  
Government Answer:  No.  However, it was used for production. 
Contractor Answer:  No.  We used smaller concentrated teams with PM over site. 
H4.  During the Development stage of the project, how many people on the team were 
collocated very close together? (On the same floor of a building within a one-minute 
walk of each other.)  
Government Answer:  None. 
 Contractor Answer:  Some, over a third. 
H4a.  Including the above, how many people on the team were collocated in the same 
building?  
Government Answer:  Few were collocated in the same building. 
 Contractor Answer:  Most, 2/3rds or more were collocated in the same building. 
H5.  How many people on the team involved in the development stage had worked before 
with others on the project?  
Government Answer:  Most, two thirds of the people or more had worked before 
with others on the project. 
 Contractor Answer:  Some, over a third had worked before with others on the 
project. 
 
Team Participants & Communications during Development. 
Here are some statements about the people on the project during the system development 
stage.  Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement that each statement is a 
description of team processes on this project. 
D7.  Team meetings were sometimes frustrating and non-productive. 
Government Answer:  Strongly agree. 
Contractor Answer:  Neither agree or disagree. 
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D9. Project results did not take advantage of the team’s best ideas.  
Government Answer:  Disagree somewhat. 
Contractor Answer:  Disagree somewhat. 
D13.  Management project reviews were constructive & helpful.  
Government Answer:  Neither agree or disagree. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
D14.  Formal reviews were conducted at key decision points. 
Government Answer:  Strongly agree. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
D16.  Usually team knew right away where to get necessary outside help. 
Government Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
D19.  The Government PM was reluctant to share problems with Army leaders. 
Government Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
Contractor Answer:  Disagree somewhat. 
 
Activity Report during System Development Stage of Project. 
How often did team members do the following during Development?   
F4.  Needed management help to resolve project team disagreements? 
Government Answer:  Many times. 
Contractor Answer:  Several times. 
 





H3. Key Skills.  Defined as skills “that if they were not available at all, would have 
stopped team progress at the point when they were needed.”   Were there any key 
skills not adequately represented on the team? 
Government Answer:  Yes, more than one.  The team lacked producibility 
professionals from suppliers and Government logistics experts. 
Contractor Answer:  No. 
D1.  The team leader was good at resolving technical disagreements. 
Government Answer:  Strongly agree. 
Contractor Answer:  Neither agree or disagree. 
D2.  The team leader was good at getting necessary resources. 
Government Answer:  Strongly agree. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
D3.  There was a lot of turnover in team membership. 
Government Answer:  Strongly disagree. 
Contractor Answer:  Neither agree or disagree. 
D4.  The team leader had both design & production experience. 
Government Answer:  Strongly disagree. 
Contractor Answer:  Neither agree or disagree. 
D5. The team leader had very high technical competence. 
Government Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
D6. Some key technical skills were not represented on the team itself. 
Government Answer:  Strongly disagree. 
Contractor Answer:  Disagree somewhat. 
D8. Professionals were split across too many different tasks & teams. 
Government Answer:  Neither agree or disagree. 
Contractor Answer:  Neither agree or disagree. 
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D10. Key members continued through pre-production planning and testing. 
Government Answer:  Strongly agree. 
Contractor Answer:  Agree somewhat. 
 
Relationships with manufacturing and suppliers:  Survey questions F1-F3, 
F10-F13, W1-W2, W16-W18 
 
Activity Report during System Development Stage of Project. 
How often did team members do the following during Development? 
F1.  Went to the shop floor to meet about related production processes. 
Government Answer:  Many times. 
Contractor Answer:  Several times. 
F2.  Asked for supplier comments & suggestions on design choices. 
Government Answer:  Many times. 
Contractor Answer:  Several times. 
F3.  Showed and discussed physical models of new components with suppliers. 
Government Answer:  Many times. 
Contractor Answer:  Several times. 
 
SHARED DESIGN-PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES during System Development.  
Here only count joint meetings or discussions that included both DESIGN and people 
from PRODUCTION and/or from the PROGRAM concerned with production of the 
System.  How often did team members do the following during Development? 
F10.  Passed around physical prototypes during joint discussions. 
Government Answer:  Several times. 
Contractor Answer:  Several times. 
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F11.  Held planning meetings that included both design & production people. 
Government Answer:  Several times. 
Contractor Answer:  Several times. 
 
F12. Explored choices together with computational models or analytic tools. 
Government Answer:  Several times. 
Contractor Answer:  Several times. 
F13. Had test articles or pre-production parts to discuss and examine jointly. 
Government Answer:  Several times. 
Contractor Answer:  Several times. 
 
ACTIVITY PHASING BY STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION. 
When did the team carry out the following activities? 
 
W1. When did production representatives participate regularly? 
Government Answer:  Later in development. 
Contractor Answer:  Later in development. 
W2. When did team members meet with production on shop floor? 
Government Answer:  During Transition to Production. 
Contractor Answer:  Later in development. 
 
Relationship & Activities between Engineering Design & Production/Program 
These questions are different because they focus only on joint meetings or discussions 
that included both DESIGN personnel and people from PRODUCTION and/or 
PROGRAM people concerned with production. 
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W16. When did the team & technical professionals from Production have unscheduled 
& informal joint conversations about the project? 
Government Answer:  During Transition to Production. 
Contractor Answer:  Later in development. 
W17. When were analytic engineering tools used jointly by design? 
Government Answer:  During Transition to Production. 
Contractor Answer:  Later in development. 
W18. When were prototypes and parts used in joint discussions? 
Government Answer:  During Transition to Production. 
Contractor Answer:  Later in development. 
 
F. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 5:  KEY PM ISSUE 
What was the key issue that the PM had to deal with during the project and how 
was it dealt with?  This question will be addressed by looking at the primary issue that 
the PM focused most attention and resources.  The key PM issue is addressed in survey 
question I2.   
 
Key PM Issue:  Survey question I2 
 Government Answer:  The PM controlled/dictated the R&D Program.  Had he not 
dictated the R&D program there would not be an AAH today.  That does not make it 
correct or acceptable.  Control of the production project was, in my estimation, the 
biggest fundamental problem the PM had to deal with in managing the overall program. 
Problem of control was basically the external environment, i.e., the sheer number of 
agencies, that were to be contended with on a regular basis under the “team” approach.  
Like the internal organization, each had their own axe to grind and each had some level 
of input.  As an example, meetings were inordinately large and therefore more difficult to 
control.  Decisions that should have been made instantly were negotiated to death leaving 
cost and schedule impacts to be resolved.  Each PM’s style was significantly different 
and varied.  During R&D the military were given no more than lip service.  During 
initial/early production the military were the only ones to input to the PM.  The period 
1990-1996 were years of the very best management in the program.  The military were 
competent leaders and did pay close consideration to the civilian technical support. 
Contractor Answer:  Don’t know.
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 1. Basic principles observed and reported.  Scientific research begins to be translated 
into applied research and development concepts.  There have been paper studies of 
technology’s basic properties.  
 2. Technology concept and/or application formulated. Practical applications have 
been invented.   Application is speculative and there is no proof or detailed analysis to 
support the assumptions. Examples are still limited to paper studies. 
 3. Analytical & experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of 
concept. Analytical and laboratory studies have physically validated analytic 
predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples include components 
that are not yet integrated or representative 
 4. Component and/or bread board validation in lab environment. Basic 
technological components are integrated to establish that pieces will work together, 
e.g., integration of ad hoc parts in lab. This is relatively “low fidelity” compared to 
the eventual system. 
 5. Components and/or bread board validation in relevant environment. Fidelity of 
breadboard technology is significantly increased. Basic components integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so the technology can be tested in a 
simulated environment. Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory integration of 
components. 
 6. System/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment.  
Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond the breadboard 
tested for TRL 5, tested in a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a 
technology’s demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high 
fidelity laboratory environment or in a simulated operational environment.         
 7. System prototype demonstrated in an operational environment.  Prototype near 
or at planned operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring 
the demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such 
as in an aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed 
aircraft. 
 8. Actual system completed and qualified in test and demonstration.  Technology 
proven to work in final form and under expected conditions.  In almost all cases, this 
TRL represents the end of true system development. Examples include developmental 
test and evaluation in its intended weapon system to determine if it meets design 
specification. 
9. Actual system proven in successful operational environment.  Actual application 
of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as those 
encountered in operational test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of 
the last “bug fixing” aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions. 
 





1. The subsystem or component application embodying the technology is produced 
inside the lab by engineers, scientists or laboratory technicians to demonstrate 
principles for breadboard validation and testing. 
2. The application is produced outside the lab with tools and processes used for 
producing very low quantities.  
3. The application is produced in low quantities with tools and processes planned to be 
used in production systems.  Testing procedures for components and subsystems are 
established.   
4. The system involving the technology application(s) is engineered for production.  All 
components are identified, integration, assembly and test planning is complete.  
5.   Low rate production has been run using the production processes planned for full rate 
production, complete with validated procedures for integration, assembly and test of the 
system. 
 


































My analysis is divided into two parts, a combined survey contained in Appendix 
C that will be used by the University of Alabama Huntsville / Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology researchers for a crosscutting analysis, comparing several systems used in 
Desert Storm, and the written analysis contained in this chapter. 
The first step in my analysis is to build a composite questionnaire of the 
Government and contractor responses.  To complete this task, I first looked at all of the 
questions that had the same response.  If this answer corresponded to my research, I 
accepted it.  Where responses differed from my research, I considered the sources and 
made a logical decision as to which was the best answer.  This mainly occurred with 
actual dates.  To resolve conflicts among responses I looked at several factors.  My first 
judgment was based on the resources; the reference documents that I used are contained 
in Appendix A.  If no additional data was available, I considered the position of the 
respondents with respect to the question at hand.  For example, when discussing user 
support, I relied more on the Government response, as they most likely had much more 
contact with the user community.  On the other hand, I was more apt to use the 
contractors’ response for questions dealing with supplier issues.  Where more information 
was required, I conducted follow-up interviews with either the survey respondents or 
other employees familiar with the project during the specific time frame in question. 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the data obtained from the survey 
questions supplemented with other research data as necessary to clarify the results.  All 
data was organized by topic in the previous chapter – this method of organization will be 
carried forth, survey question numbers, [#], are annotated throughout so the reader can 
reference the combined questionnaire in Appendix C, research citation references are 
listed in Appendix A {ref #}.  Historical events from Chapter II are used to keep the 





B. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 1:  USER SUPPORT AND FUNDING 
 
“To what extent was there user support and funding stability during system 
development?”  This question will be addressed by looking at the role of the user, 
requirements and funding stability.  I will primarily focus on the answers from the 
Government side of the Program Management Office (PMO) as they had direct contact 
with the Army user community. 
The PM staff had a good working relationship with the users and frequently 
consulted them on key project issues [D18, F5, & W3]. The user organizations showed 
strong support during Apache development [W5].  As discussed in Chapter 2, a sense of 
urgency came over the Army leadership following the rise of the Air Force A-10 program 
and the demise of the Army’s Cheyenne program.  Survey respondents concurred that 
combat development representatives of the troops in the field were on board early in the 
program and supported the program as it evolved [W3, F5 & W5].  Once the Apache PM 
office was established in April 1973 [D], the PM kept in close contact with Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and user representatives during the remaining phases of 
the project [D18].  That close working relationship helped user support to grow as the 
program progressed toward production.  As is usual with the military rotation cycle, there 
were several changes in key user personnel during the program [F6 & W4]. Top 
leadership helped made sure that these changes occurred early in development and 
between development and the transition to production [F6 & W4].  Keeping key user 
personnel on board through major milestones helped to minimize the effect of these 
inevitable changes. 
Initially, clear requirements helped to keep the program on course [F7, W6 & 
B13].  The Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) Mission Needs Statement (MNS) and 
operational requirements were the result of a revalidation of the Advanced Aerial Fire 
Support System qualitative material requirements that spawned the Cheyenne program.  
The new mission needs statement (MNS) stipulated that the AAH would be in production 
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by 1978. {ref 2} This put the program on a tight schedule from the start.  There were 
several new technologies on the horizon that could not be integrated in time to meet the 
fielding date; the Hellfire missile contained such technology [T1].  The PM worked 
closely with the user community to build a program that would meet their needs [W3 & 
D18] (e.g., being able to fight a cold war battle in all weather conditions) and still meet 
the first unit equipped (FUE) timeline. 
It was said that the PM ruled with an iron fist as the system progressed through 
development.  This caused great consternation throughout the technical community, but 
kept the program on course [I2].  Significant effort was spent on controlling the problem 
of requirements creep [F7, W6 & B13].  Although there were changes in system 
requirements [F7] as the program evolved, such as the laser guided Hellfire missile added 
in February 1976 {ref 2}, the close working relationship between the user and PM office 
[F5] helped foster a mutual trust.  Most significant requirement changes were kept to a 
minimum as the program progressed through development and on into production [W6].  
Many requirement changes were addressed as preplanned product improvements after the 
system transitioned to production {ref 3}. 
The project significantly exceeded initial budget estimates [O8].  Prior to approval 
of a large program by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense has their Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) provide a per unit cost 
estimate.  The CAIG is chartered to provide an independent review of life-cycle cost 
estimates and to determine if additional analysis is required.  The CAIG’s flyaway cost 
estimate for the Apache was $1.7 million in fiscal 1972 dollars.  {ref 2} 
The program was slowed down, due to funding cuts [H1].  As the Carter 
administration took the reins of Government in Washington in 1976, the Apache flyaway 
cost had significantly increased.  The new Secretary of Defense in the Carter 
Administration, Harold Brown, formerly the Secretary of the Air Force, was specifically 
the one who pushed for the A-10 that helped kill the Cheyenne program.  Brown cut the 
Apache budget by one half on the second week of the Carter Presidency. {ref 2}  To 
make up for the funding shortfall, the development program was stretched [H1, D1, & 
B2] an additional ten months {ref 1}.   
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There was often uncertainty about the future of project funding during the system 
development stage [D11].  Flyaway costs hit $6.4 million in FY 1977 dollars {ref 1}.  
The 1978 DoD appropriations bill contained only half the requested funding for the 
Apache; the program was almost cancelled {ref 2}.  Despite the cuts the program pressed 
on and the platform proved itself during subsequent user testing.  The high marks that the 
Apache received from the test community helped greatly when the program moved for 
production approval.  In 1982, Congress authorized $444.5 million for low rate initial 
production. {ref 1} 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 2:  CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES 
 
“To what extent did the maturity of critical technologies being integrated into the 
Apache influence development?  How were the organizations that had developed the 
critical technologies involved during system development?” 
This question will be addressed by looking at three critical technologies central to 
the success of the development for the Apache in terms of technology readiness, the 
project timeline and project outcomes.  I will also evaluate the involvement of various 
organizations during system development.  Survey data includes:  the role of the various 
science and technology (S&T) organizations, integration difficulties, production 
readiness, the role of the prime contractor and problem identification. 
AAH systems planning and pre-development work started in 1970, soon after the 
Cheyenne contract was terminated.  Government respondents stated that they never even 
changes offices, they went from working Cheyenne one day, to the AAH program the 
next.  As documented in chapter 2, the Cheyenne had tried to push too far beyond the 
current state-of-art technology; this caused serious cost over runs and schedule slips.  The 
new AAH program quickly distanced itself from the Cheyenne. {ref 2}  Technology 
readiness was a key factor in determining the capabilities needed for the new aircraft 
[SP]. 
The Apache program wanted to integrate several new technologies onto its 
platform [T1].  These were highly sophisticated subsystems from as many as eight 
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different PMO’s along with a number of subsystems developed by the prime contractor 
and other suppliers {ref 2}.  Initial surveys identified several of these different 
technologies, all in the area of mission equipment [T1].  Government interviewees, in 
response to the survey, identified the following technologies:  visionics, computers and 
avionics [T1].  Interviewees from the contractor community responded with the Target 
Acquisition/Designation (TADS), Forward Looking Infrared System (FLIRS), and the 
Hellfire Missile Integration [T1].  In order to have a clear view of technology integration, 
I will concentrate my analysis on just three of these critical technologies.  In order to 
have consistent answers, participants were asked to respond to this single set of critical 
technologies [T1]. 
These technologies are considered to be among those central to the success of the 
Apache system, that is, the program may have failed if these technologies were not 
available for production.  They are as follows: the Target Acquisition Designation 
System/Pilot Night Vision System (TADS/PNVS) [T1], used to acquire targets in all 
battlefield conditions.  Second are the computer systems [T1].  These are the processors 
used to control the flow of information on the platform.  The third critical technology 
addressed is the avionics used to control aircraft flight [T1]. 
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The systems planning stage of the program started with a revalidation of the 
requirements.  The Government respondent noted that the definition of the Advanced 
Attack Helicopter was centered around what the Department of the Army thought the 
helicopter industry was capable of producing [SP].  Great care was taken to assure that 
the technologies were feasible prior to sending requests for proposals to industry.  The 
system technology readiness level (TRL) was at level 2 [SP].  A complete definition of 
the nine TRLs can be found in figure 9, page 44.  At level 2 the technology concept and 
application had been formulated.  Practical applications had been invented.  However, the 
application was speculative and there was no proof or detailed analysis to support the 
assumptions.  Examples were still limited to paper studies.  At the subsystem level, the 
TADS/PNVS and computer systems needed the most work as they were both rated at 
level 2 on the TRL scale.  Some systems were taken off the critical path at the beginning 
of development, only to be added later as they matured {ref 2}.  The avionics system was 
rated a level 6.  Avionics system and subsystem models and prototypes were 
demonstrated in a relevant environment.  Representative models and prototype systems, 
which were well beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, had been tested in a relevant 
environment.  This represented a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated readiness.  
Avionics prototypes had been tested in high fidelity laboratory environments and in 
simulated operational environments, that is, TRL 6 [D]. 
The Government respondent confirmed that the Army labs at CECOM and 
TRADOC accomplished the primary work performed in the period from system planning 
to development with oversight from the Government program management team 
remaining from Cheyenne.  Much of the behind the scenes effort was done by potentially 
competing contractors vying for the replacement of the Lockheed Cheyenne [SP]. Five 
companies submitted proposals for the AAH.  They were: Sikorsky, Boeing-Vertol, Bell 
Helicopter, Hughes, and Lockheed. {ref 1} 
The development program started in April 1973 [D], as the AAH PMO was first 
stood-up; BG Samuel G. Cockerham was the first PM {ref 1}.  The first task of the new 
PMO was to down-select the proposals received towards the end of the systems planning 
stage.  Hughes and Bell Helicopter were selected for competitive development {ref 1}.  
Each would build prototypes that would compete in a “winner take all” fly-off for the 
production contract.  The new PMO had a lot of work to do in a very short period of time. 
At the start of development, the technology readiness level (TRL) for the overall 
system was estimated to be at level 5 [D], that is, components and/or breadboard 
validation had been done in a relevant environment.  Fidelity of breadboard technology 
was significantly increased.  Basic components were integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so the technology could be tested in a simulated environment.  
Examples included “high fidelity” laboratory integration of components.  The production 
readiness level (PRL) for the system at this point was at best level 2 [D].  A complete 
definition of the five PRL’s can be found in figure 10, page 45.  Level 2 is defined as the 
maturity of process technology sufficient to be produced outside the lab with tools and 
processes used for producing very low quantities.  During development, the Army lab 
center’s involvement at CECOM evolved around engineering support and requirements 
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interpretation [D].  However, in the case of the TADS/PNVS, the Army’s Night Vision 
and Electro-Optic Lab had much of the expertise in this new technology [D]. 
Critical technologies were in several different levels of readiness at development 
start [D].  Suppliers were quickly trying to bring their subsystems up to maturity levels 
that would support integration into other systems [D].  The TADS/PNVS and computer 
systems were both rated at level 4 on the TRL scale at the start of this phase [D].  Each 
had been through component and/or breadboard validation in a lab environment.  Basic 
technological components were integrated to establish that pieces would work together, 
e.g., integration of ad hoc parts in lab.  This was still relatively “low fidelity” compared 
to the eventual system.  The avionics systems were much more advanced, level 7, as 
many had been integrated into other platforms to some degree [D].  Avionics prototypes 
had been demonstrated in an operational environment.  These prototypes were near or at 
a planned operational state.  This represented a major step up from level 6, requiring the 
demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment in an aircraft.  
Avionics prototypes were being used in test bed aircraft [D]. 
Apache transition to production occurred in April 1982 [TP].  This was defined as 
the period when the producible system prototype had been demonstrated in an operational 
environment.  The prototype was near or at the planned operational system and capable 
of being produced on a small scale.   Each of the three critical technologies had also 
reached technology readiness level 8 [TP].  The Production Readiness Level for the 
system on this date had grown to level 3, as it was produced in low quantities with tools 
and processes that had been planned to be used in the production systems [TP].  Testing 
procedures for components and subsystems were established, while subsystems and 
support had not been finalized.  The competing prime contractors’ science and 
technology organizations accomplished the primary work in the period from development 
to this point.  Other organizations that had been involved in the period included active 
support from component suppliers and the CECOM and Night Vision Army Lab Centers 
[TP].  The nature of the Army Lab Center’s involvement was engineering support, 
simulation and testing [TP].  Also involved were other supplier organizations while other 
DoD science and technology organizations were kept informed of the progress [TP]. 
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After the system was accepted and was in the transition to production phase, 
significant changes in the designs and processes were later required before the system 
was taken into full production [TP].  Each of the critical technologies was used as 
planned in the final system [TP].  After the system was actually in production, significant 
changes in designs and processes were also required.  However, the results of the system 
as it was implemented, met or exceeded the project’s technical goals [TP]. 
Survey respondents noted that the system experienced some problems in the field 
under operational conditions in Desert Storm [TP].  Sand and dust played a significant 
role in many of the problems {ref 3}.  The Government respondent felt that these 
problems were caused from the requirements not reflecting the true field environment 
[TP]. 
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 3:  TEST STRATEGY 
 
“Did the test strategy adequately evaluate the system for operational use?”  This 
question will be addressed by looking at the test approach utilized. 
The test strategy for the Apache was divided into several phases [SP, D, TP].  The 
initial testing for Phase I of the program involved two competing contractor designs.  As 
documented in chapter 2, Hughes Helicopter and Bell Helicopters were each awarded a 
contract in June of 1973 to proceed into development.  The designs would compete in a 
fly-off.  The first flight for both aircraft occurred in September 1975 followed by six 
months of contractor testing.  Prototype aircraft were delivered to the Army in June 1976 
for evaluation.  The Hughes design won the competition and was awarded the phase II 
contract in December 1976. {ref 1} 
The Apache program entered testing with the failure of the Cheyenne program 
fresh on everyone’s mind {Ch 2}.  A failure modes and effects analysis was done on the 
system.  This analysis was performed early enough for the results to be used to establish 
the test plan.  The failure analysis also helped establish the critical test parameters for 
both the system and key components. [V1] 
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Several organizations were involved in testing the various components that were 
about to be integrated onto the Apache [V2 – V7].  Testing and simulations were 
performed first to see if the individual components of the system worked [V3, V5 & V7].  
The prime contractor, component suppliers and Army labs at both CECOM (Avionics) 
and the Night Vision lab (TADS/PNVS) performed the bulk of this testing with oversight 
from the PMO [V2 – V7]. 
The integrated components were tested working together in a controlled setting 
[V4].  This testing takes the most time, as problems are found, fixed and retested.  To 
reduce the cost of retest, simulations were also performed with the components working 
together in a controlled setting [V5].  The prime contractor, suppliers and to a limited 
degree, Army labs performed these simulations [V5].  A hardware-in-the-loop type 
systems integration simulation laboratory was used to see if the individual components of 
the system worked and to see if integrated components worked in a controlled setting 
[V7]. 
As the system evolved, testing was performed on the components working 
together in a realistic setting [V6].  The organizations that performed this testing included 
the prime, suppliers and Army labs [V6].  Once all the bugs were worked out, the system 
was turned over to the Government operational testers for their independent evaluations. 
The Apache OT II was performed by Army pilots and occurred from June to August 
1981 at Ft. Hunter Liggett. {ref 8}  The program managers’ office kept a constant vigil 
over the testing.  To accomplish this, the Apache PMO established a field office at the 
test area. {ref 1 & 8}  This office kept the PM aware of what was going on at the test site, 
quickly resolved problems and facilitated the flow of spare parts {ref 8}.  This 
relationship helped the Apache program stay on course and get through operational 
testing on schedule and within budget.  The system soon advanced to Milestone III and 
approval to enter into production [O3 & O5]. 
There were several environmental issues found when the Apaches were first 
deployed [O9x].  When they fought in a jungle, water intrusion was a major problem {ref 
2}.  During the Gulf War, the fine sand particles caused new challenges {ref 3}. 
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 E. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 4:  TEAMS 
 
“How effectively were teams employed during development?”  This question will 
be addressed by looking at the use of teams, proper staffing, and interrelationships 
between the government, manufacturing and suppliers. 
The project was not set up with a cross-functional IPT, that is, a project team 
drawn from different parts of the organization with most of the skills needed for the 
development [H2].  The current trend in project organization is to form cross-functional 
integrated product teams (IPT).  This is used to assure that all aspects of process 
integration are addressed.  The Apache program development occurred during the 1970’s, 
about 20 years prior to the use of the formal IPT process [D].  Instead the project team 
had smaller technical cells each concentrating their own specific piece of the program.  
The contractor’s program management office had oversight of the cells and was 
responsible for pulling all of the pieces together [H2]. 
According to the survey results, nearly two thirds of the people on the contractor’s 
team were new employees and thus, had never even worked with others in the company 
until the Apache development [H5].  Attack helicopter development was new to Hughes 
Helicopters {ref 2}.  During the development stage of the project, the contractor had just 
over one third of the people on the team collocated in the same building [H4a].  Few were 
collocated very close together, that is, on the same floor of a building within a one-
minute walk [H4].  However, key technical skills were well represented on the team itself 
[H3].  Key members stayed with the team through pre-production planning and testing 
[D10]. 
The team leaders were skillful at getting necessary resources [D2]. Team leaders 
were fairly effective at resolving technical disagreements during development [D1].  
Turnover in team membership was minimized [D3 & D10].  Team leaders needed 
management help to resolve project team disagreements several times [F4].  Usually the 
team knew right away where to get necessary outside help [D16]. 
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Formal reviews were conducted at key decision points [D14].  The primary goal 
of these meetings was to pass high-level data among the key players and the Government.   
These management project reviews were only minimally constructive [D13].  These 
reviews tended to take away from the flow of the project as personnel spent extra time 
with the rigid documentation requirements.  Reviews for major weapon systems tend to 
attract large numbers of participants.  Meetings were sometimes unwieldy, frustrating and 
non-productive [D7]. 
Later in development team members started to go to the shop floor to meet about 
related production processes [F1].  Planning meetings were held that included both 
design and production people [F11].  Physical prototypes were passed around during 
these joint discussions [F10].  They asked for supplier comments and suggestions on 
design choices [F2].  Team members showed and discussed physical models of new 
components with suppliers [F3].  Design and production technicians explored choices 
together with computational models and analytical tools [F12].  They used test articles or 
pre-production hardware to discuss and examine problems [F13].  Just prior to the 
production transition phase, production representatives participated regularly in 
development meetings [W1].  Team members also began to meet regularly with 
production personnel out on the shop floor [W2].  Technical professionals from 
production started to have unscheduled, informal joint conversations about the project 
with design personnel [W16].  At that point, analytic engineering tools were being used 
jointly by design and production [W17].  Prototypes and parts were being used regularly 
in joint discussions [W18]. 
As the program was readied for production, it became evident that logistics skills 
were lacking from the program [H3].  Realizing the deficiencies, a cross-functional 
working arrangement was key for the transition into production [H2].  Logistics is 
traditionally pushed off until the end of the program.  This can have serious, long lasting 
effects on the user if not addressed.  Although the team leader was technically competent 
[D5], he had little experience in both design and production [D4].  By the time the 
program entered production, a form of IPT approach was used to resolve problems [H2].  
Project results benefited from the team’s best ideas [D9]. 
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F. RESEARCH QUESTION NUMBER 5:  KEY PM ISSUE 
 
What was the key issue that the PM had to deal with during the project and how 
was it dealt with?  This question will be addressed by looking at the primary issue where 
the PM focused most of his attention and resources. 
The Government survey respondent rated control of the production project as, the 
biggest fundamental problem the PM had to deal with in managing the overall program 
[I2].  Problems of control were basically the external environment, i.e., the sheer number 
of agencies that were to be contended with on a regular basis under the “team” approach.  
Like the internal organization, each had their own axe to grind and each had some level 
of input and “veto” power.  As an example, meetings were inordinately large and 
therefore difficult to control.  Decisions that should have been made instantly were 
negotiated to death leaving cost and schedule impacts to be resolved. [I2] 
The PM controlled and dictated the R&D Program.  Had he not dictated the R&D 
program there would not be an AAH today [I2].  An example of this control was brought 
to the researcher’s attention during a Government employee interview.  This occurred 
shortly after the initial production contract was awarded to Hughes.  At that time, Hughes 
Helicopters was headquartered in Culver City, CA.  Hughes management was looking for 
a site in the traditional California manufacturing corridor to build a production facility.  
Fearing high labor costs due to greater competition, the Apache PM, General Browne 
ordered a cost-analysis study of the area.  They found that if Hughes located in this high 
cost area, that the personnel and manufacturing costs could reduce the total Apache buy 
nearly in half.  With strong urging from top brass, and a few political incentives, Hughes 
chose Mesa, AZ to build their $300 million facility that would eventually employ two 




The purpose of this chapter is to provide conclusions and recommendations for 
further study.  I will address significant issues found in the analysis that helped make the 
program a success or that caused problems or delays.  Key areas from question 1 are:  
user representatives, requirements, and funding.  Technology readiness from question 2, 
testing from question 3 and teaming from question 4 are also addressed in this chapter. 
 
B. LESSONS LEARNED: 
User Representatives:   
The Apache program survived in a difficult political climate because the Program 
Manager and user representative worked closely together.  It is really important to get the 
user representatives on board early and it is most beneficial if the PM’s relationship 
extends to form a close working relationship with the user community.  Good user 
support is crucial throughout the program, and including the user in all major reviews can 
reinforce it.  This relationship must be based on trust.   
Requirements: 
The Apache program manager kept requirements under control by working 
together with the user.  Requirements creep must be managed but can be kept in check if 
stakeholders have a clear understanding of the evolutionary path of the system.  With 
most program developments, there are a lot of contractors who will try to sell their 
systems to the user.  The PM must be ready to manage the technological side of the 
program to help the user sort through the “smoke and mirrors” that contractors use to 
hype their wares. 
Funding: 
The Apache program experienced several funding fluctuations; the PM was ready 
and dealt with each as it occurred.  Funding stability is an issue in any large program 
spread out over many years.  People are constantly out to get your money.  You need to 
be on the lookout for internal suitors from your own service, those from other services 
and outside forces from Congress.  The slightest schedule slip or problem in a program 
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will bring its competitors to its doorstep ready to take funds that it no longer can 
execute. 
Technology: 
The Apache program had several changes in technology throughout development.  
They were able to track technology readiness in key areas and mitigate risk by moving 
certain enhancements off the critical path.  Technology readiness also played a vital role 
when adding capabilities such as the Hellfire missile.  The technology readiness levels of 
advanced systems must be clearly articulated to the user by the PM experts to assure that 
the users requirements can be met.  Technology readiness should be evaluated throughout 
the program to assure that the system can stay on schedule.  Slips in technology readiness 
can greatly cost the program. 
Teaming: 
The Apache program was developed before the advent of formal integrated 
product teams (IPT).  However, survey respondents stated that a form of IPT was used 
for early production.  Until then, the program was put together in smaller pieces, with 
teams concentrating solely on their individual area.  This caused delays in the schedule 
when key components were not ready for system level testing.  The IPT process should 
be utilized to assure that all aspects of the project are addressed.  Good leadership and a 
clear vision are keys to a successful IPT.  Membership must be addressed early so that 
decision makers are consistently present. 
Testing: 
The Apache program manager made test readiness a primary goal.  The test team 
was properly staffed with the proper resources at their disposal.  The test plan is an 
important document that helps lay out the program schedule.  By performing a Failure 
Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) early, the Apache PM was able to use 
the results to help build the test plan.  This information also feeds into the Test 
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) required for Milestone reviews.  Testing on the Apache 
followed a traditional approach of test-fix-test.  The system had clear transitions from 
development to operational testing.  The test plan was modified with funding and 
schedule slips.  It’s the program manager’s job to make sure that the system is ready for 
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test.  In the end, the fact that the system was able to demonstrate its operational capability 
in real world environments helped save the program from cancellation.   
The survey respondents documented several operational problems.  It’s 
impractical to test out every potential operational scenario.  Unforeseen problems and 
systems deficiencies are found nearly every time a new system is fielded.   
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis addressed mission equipment systems integrated into the Apache 
Attack Helicopter.  There were several other Apache-related technologies that could be 
addressed by future studies.  Possible areas of study might include: engines, 30 mm gun, 
and advanced materials. 
Funding:  Evaluate the effects of delaying funding and stretching the schedule.  
Another potential area is the overall effect of quantity cuts on the per-unit cost of major 
weapon systems. 
Testing:  Evaluate the traditional test methods of separate development test and 
operational test versus the combined testing philosophy used today.  Does the new 
method really save time and money in a large program? 
Readiness:  Evaluate the use of Technology Readiness Levels developed and used 
in the Air Force. 
Leadership:  Evaluate the effectiveness of civilian leadership in the early stages of 
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APPENDIX C:  COMBINED QUESTIONNAIRE 
DESERT STORM CASE STUDY CHECKLIST: 
LESSONS FOR TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 
The U.S. Army Materiel Command is supporting a hindsight study of how technologies were 
developed, integrated into systems, and produced in the years leading up to Desert Storm, the last large-
scale deployment of U.S. military force.  It is believed that in the years leading up to that conflict, there 
were both successful and unsuccessful applications of technology to military systems that contain lessons 
for future defense technology development.  The study can be done now because the intervening years 
allow more objectivity, and allow open examination of what were once classified projects.  The study 
must be done now because many of the men and women responsible for the development and eventual 
fielding of those systems in Gulf region are retiring, taking with them important knowledge that we 
believe should be captured and codified into practical lessons for the future. 
Our method began with a list of military systems including both successes and failures judged to 
be broadly representative of the systems that were under development in the years prior to Desert Storm.  
Then experienced students (such as those found at senior military schools and mid-career management 
programs) are being asked to create a single case study for a project on that list. Each case will include 
both (1) a narrative case history to capture the richness of the case and identify any factors that 
determined a project’s success or failure, and (2) answers to structured questions that ask about 
organization, technology and process issues in a consistent way across all cases. 
Participants in the selected projects are being asked to complete this survey form as background 
information for the students to use in their projects, and we hope you can cooperate with our research. 
This is not a traditional questionnaire.  If you do not remember the details we are asking about, or 
if you feel that the answer would be misleading or somehow inappropriate for the project we are asking 
you about, feel free to leave the answer blank.  You may rewrite the question so it fits better.  If you have 
comments to add, or want to suggest a better answer than what is provided, feel free to do so. 
While the students conducting this research may be cleared to discuss classified material, it should 
be stressed that the narratives and the answers to structured questions should never include any classified 
information.  The results will be used in unclassified reports.   
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You may request a copy of any report of the findings by providing your business card, or 
providing a separate sheet of paper with your name and address information, including your e-mail 
address.  If you have any questions, contact: 
Richard G. Rhoades William A. Lucas 
Research Institute  Sloan School of Management 
The University of Alabama in Huntsville Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Rhoadesr@email.uah.edu    (256) 824-6343 walucas@mit.edu    (617) 253-0538 
 
TO BEGIN:  The first set of questions defines three dates, keyed to technology readiness levels (see last 
page), and then asks about the roles played by different organizations at three stages of your project 
leading up to those dates.  The organizations of interest are: 
Prime’s S&T org.: Group within system prime contractor responsible for doing IR&D and  
 developing new technology and concepts. 
Other prime org.: Any prime contractor organization other than the S&T organization. 
Supplier S&T:  Same definition as for prime’s S&T organization, but located at a supplier.  
Other supplier org.: Any supplier organization other than the S&T organization. 
Army Lab/Center: One or more of the Army laboratories or research, development and engineering 
Centers. 
Other DoD/S&T org.: An equivalent of an Army Lab/Center found elsewhere in DoD. 
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SP. What was the approximate starting date of systems planning and pre-development work?  This date is when 
__January / 1970__  (mo/yr)  [TRL2 at system level] 
In what organization was the primary work leading up to this point accomplished? _CHEYENNE PM, with lead 
support from TRADOC. 
Including that organization, what organizations had been involved up to this point? (Check the role of each) 
 Prime’s S&T org. ___ Lead/co-lead   ___Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed   X  Not involved   ___DK 
 Other prime org. ___ Lead/co-lead    X  Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK  
 Supplier S&T org. ___ Lead/co-lead   ___Active support     X Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
 Other supplier org. ___ Lead/co-lead    X  Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
 Army Lab/Center   X   Lead/co-lead   ___Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
 Other DoD/S&T org. ___ Lead/co-lead    X  Active support   ___Involved  ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
What was the nature of the Army Lab/Center’s involvement? (Simulation? Concept formulation?  Integration? 
Requirements development?)  Most of the behind the scene ‘effort’ was competing contractors (Bell and Sikorsky), 
supporting their King Cobra and S-67 as replacement for the LOCKHEED CHEYENNE while supporting termination of 
the CHEYENNE Production contract as well as the eventual development contract.  Definition of the Advanced Attack 
Helicopter was centered around what the Department of Army thought the helicopter industry was capable of producing. 
_April / 1973___  (mo/yr)  
What was the Technology Readiness Level (refer to page 8) for the SYSTEM on this date?    5:  Components 
and/or bread board validation in relevant environment. Fidelity of breadboard technology is significantly increased.  Basic 
components integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so the technology can be tested in a simulated 
environment. Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory integration of components.    
  2: The application is 
produced outside the lab with tools and processes used for producing very low quantities.  
In what organization was the primary work in the period from SP to D accomplished?  Army Lab / PM 
X  Not involved   ___DK 
 Other prime org ___ Lead/co-lead   ___Active support     X Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK  
 Supplier S&T  ___ Lead/co-lead   ___Active support     X Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
 Other supplier org ___ Lead/co-lead   ___Active support     X Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
 Army Lab/Center   X   Lead/co-lead   ___Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
 Other DoD/S&T org. ___ Lead/co-lead    X  Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
What was the nature of the Army Lab/Center’s involvement? (Engineering support?  Simulation or testing?  
Integration? Requirements interpretation?) _ Engineering support & Requirements interpretation  
TP. Date of achieving “Transition to Production” when producible system prototype has been demonstrated in an 
operational environment.  Prototype is near or at planned operational system, produced on small scale.     TRANSITION 
TO PRODUCTION (TP) DATE:      April / 1982     (mo/yr) (TRL7 at system level) 
What was the Production Readiness Level for the SYSTEM on this date?  3: The application is produced in low 
quantities with tools and processes planned to be used in production systems.  Testing procedures for components 
and subsystems are established.   
 In what organization was the primary work in the period from D to TP accomplished? Prime S&T Organization 
Including that organization, what organizations had been involved in the period D to TP? (Check the role of each.)
 Prime’s S&T org  X   Lead/co-lead   ___Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
 Other prime org ___ Lead/co-lead    X  Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK  
 Supplier S&T  ___ Lead/co-lead    X  Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
 Other supplier org ___ Lead/co-lead   ___Active support     X Involved   ___Kept informed  ___Not involved   ___DK 
planning work began on the integrated system. The systems concept and applications had been formulated, 
but applications were still speculative.  There was no proof or detailed analysis to support the approach. 
                SYSTEMS PLANNING START DATE (SP):   
D. Date when Development started. Typically at this date, funding started for system advanced or engineering 
development, a gov’t project office was formed and prime contractor(s) selected. 
      DEVELOPMENT START DATE: (D):  
What was the Production Readiness Level (refer to page 8) for the SYSTEM on this date?   
Including that organization, what organizations had been involved in the period SP to D? (Check the role of each.)
 Prime’s S&T org ___ Lead/co-lead   ___Active support   ___Involved   ___Kept informed   
69 
What was the nature of the Army Lab/Center’s involvement? (Engineering support?
Simulation or testing?  Integration? Requirements interpretation?) _ Engineering support, Simulation & 
Testing 
 
Please note: Here we shift away from the system as a whole, and move to its component 
technologies. 
T1. Now identify one or more (up to 3) technologies that were incorporated into the system you are
studying.  These technologies should be among those central to the success of the system. 
  Technology A    Target Acquisition/Designation/Pilot Night Vision System  (TADS/PNVS)    
  Technology B       Computers      
   Technology C       Avionics      
 
T2. How new was each technology to the prime contractor?  For each technology A, B, and C, was the 
technology: (Answer for date you provided for Development start , D.) 
   
   Technology A Technology B    Technology C
   TADS/PNVS Computers   Avionics
New and unproven for the prime contractor?   1.  X    1.  X     1.  X   
Technology had been used by prime contractor but it was new to  
 to this kind of application? 2. ___  2. ___  2. ___ 
Technology had been used by prime contractor in similar applications 
 and was well understood?  3. ___  3. ___  3. ___ 
Don’t know, can’t remember, or would have to guess 9. ___  9. ___  9. ___ 
 
T3. Production Impact. What was the impact of the technology on then existing production processes? 
  (Answer for date you provided for Development start , D.)  
   Technology A Technology B    Technology C
   TADS/PNVS  Computers   Avionics 
Technology forced deep and serious production process change? 1. ____  1.  X   1. ____ 
Technology caused significant production process change?  2.  X   2. ____  2.  X__  
Technology did not require much production process change 3. ____  3. ____  3. ____ 
Don’t know, can’t remember, or would have to guess 9. ____  9. ____  9. ____ 
 
T4. Looking back at the Development start date, at that time how important were these technologies to 
the prime? 
Check (√) the best answer for each technology. Technology A Technology B    Technology C
 TADS/PNVS Computers   Avionics
This system was the Prime’s only planned application of the technology. 1.  X   1. ___  1. ___   
Prime was planning or had started follow-on uses of the technology. 2. ___  2.  X   2.  X  
Technology was being used in other applications and it was 
expected to be significant area of competence for the Prime.  3. ___  3. ___  3. ___ 
Don’t know, can’t remember, or would have to guess. 9. ___  9. ___  9. ___ 
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Now look at the SP, D, and TP dates you provided above for the System.  Using the Technology Readiness (TRL) 
Scale on page 8, find the number that represents the readiness of the separate technologies the team was working 
with at each point in time.  Please answer here for the state of development of each component technology. (NOT 
for the over-all system which was the focus in the questions above.) 
    Technology A   Technology B   Technology C 
  TADS/PNVS Computers Avionics 
T5. When System planning and pre-development began, technology TRL was:  # __2___ # __2___  # __6___ 
T6. When System went into Development, technology TRL was:  # __4___  # __4___ # __7___ 
T7. When System reached Transition to Production, technology TRL was: # __8___  # __8___ # __8___ 
 
T8. For each of the technologies A, B & C, did an Army Laboratory or Center make a significant contribution to 
achieving any of the above levels of technology readiness?  
 Technology A Technology B  Technology C 
 TADS/PNVS Computers   Avionics 
T8.  Yes, it contributed to Readiness at start of Planning/Pre-development.  8a    Y   8b.  ____ 8c.  Y   
T9.  Yes, it contributed to Readiness for Development.  9a.   Y   9b.  ____ 9c.  Y   
T10. Yes, it contributed to Readiness for Transition to Production.  10a .  Y    10b.  Y   10c.  Y   
Tn.   No, an Army lab or center did not make a significant contribution. No a ____  No-b ____       No-c ____ 
Tdk. Don’t know, can’t say, don’t remember.  DKa. ____  DKb  ____  DKc ____ 
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Project History, Staffing and Location 
H1.  At some point, was the project either:  _ X _ 1. Slowed down?  ___ 2. Stopped and restarted?   ___ 3. Neither     
H2.  Was the project set up as a cross-functional integrated product team (IPT), a project team drawn from different  
 parts of the contractor’s organization with most of the skills needed for the development?       ___ Yes    _ X __ No 
If YES, was it: ____  1. Set up by management, with different functions & departments tasked to provide team members. 
  ____  2. Set up informally, with team expected to ask departments for help as needs emerged. 
H3. Key Skills.  This question asks about “key skills” essential to the success of the project, defined as skills 
 “that if they were not available at all, would have stopped team progress at the point when they were needed.”   
Were there any key skills not adequately represented on the team?  ___No.   _ X _ Yes, one.  ___ Yes, more than one.     
IF YES:  H35. What were the missing key skills? Please check (9 ) any and all that apply. 
      ___ 1. Internal technical professionals ___ 4.  Technical/development people from Suppliers 
  ___ 2. Producibility professionals  (DFM, other)  ___ 5.  Producibility professionals from Suppliers  
  ___ 3. Financial/contracts professionals _ X  _ 6.  Other.  Please specify _Logistics____ 
H4. During the Development stage of the project, how many people on the team were collocated very close 
 together? (On the same floor of a building within a one minute walk.) 
 ___1. All   ___2. Most (2/3rds or more)    ___3. Some (over a third)    _ X __4. Few    ____5. None    ____DK/can’t say 
  H4a. Including the above, how many people on the team were collocated in the same building? 
    ___1. All   ___2. Most (2/3rds or more)    _ X __3. Some (over a third)    ___4. Few    ____5. None    ____DK/can’t say 
H5. How many people on the team involved in the Development stage had worked before with others on the project? 
 ___1. All   ___2. Most (2/3rds or more)    _ X __3. Some (over a third)    ___4. Few    ____5. None    ____DK/can’t say 
H6. Whose facilities were going to be the primary production site for the application of the new technologies? 
   ___1. Prime contractor’s facilities  _ X _2. Both prime and supplier facilities ___3. Supplier facilities  
 
Validation Activities: Testing and Simulation 
V1. Was a failure modes and effects analysis done on the system? 1.__ X __ Yes        2.____ No        3. ___ Don’t know 
              V1a. If yes, was it used to help establish the test plan?     1.__ X __ Yes        2.____ No       3.  ___ Don’t know 
For individual components: 
V2. Was there testing to see if the individual components of the system worked? What organization(s) did this testing? 
          _ X _ Prime   _ X _ Suppliers   _ X _ Army center/lab   ___Other govt org.  ___Not done on project  ___ Don’t know 
V3. Were there simulations run to see if the individual components of the system worked? What organization(s) 
 did these simulations?   
          _ X _ Prime   _ X _ Suppliers   _ X _ Army center/lab   ___Other govt org.  ___Not done on project  ___ Don’t know 
 
For integrated components in controlled setting: 
V4. Were the components tested working together in a controlled setting? What organization(s) did this testing? 
          _ X _ Prime   _ X _ Suppliers   _ X _ Army center/lab   ___Other govt org.  ___Not done on project  ___ Don’t know 
V5. Were there simulations of the components working together in a controlled setting? What organization(s) did this?   
         _ X _ Prime   _ X _ Suppliers    X limited Army center/lab   __Other govt org.  __Not done on project  __ Don’t know 
 
For integrated components in a realistic setting: 
V6. Was there testing of the components working together in a realistic setting? What organization(s) did this testing? 
         _ X _ Prime   _ X _ Suppliers   _ X _ Army center/lab   _X _Other govt org.  ___Not done on project  ___ Don’t know 
 
V7. Was a hardware-in-the-loop type systems integration simulation laboratory used?  
 V7a. To see if the individual components of the system worked:    _X _1. Yes   ___2. No     ___9. Don’t know 
 V7b. To see if integrated components worked in controlled setting:  _X _1. Yes   ___2. No     ___9. Don’t know 
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V8. Recalling the total effort (100%) spent on testing and simulations, please allocate the percent of that total that were:  
 __10__ % spent to see if the individual components of the system worked 
 __65__ % spent to see if integrated components worked in controlled setting 
 __20__ % spent to see if integrated components worked in a realistic setting 
 __05__ % spent on any other validation purpose.     
               100  %    
 
Please evaluate the following statements Strongly   Disagree   Neither agree   Agree   Strongly     Don’t 
  about the use of testing and simulations on the project.  disagree   somewhat  nor disagree  somewhat   agree      know 
 V9.  Knowledge from validation work was used consistently 
  to improve components and system. 1              2              3              X              5 9 
V10.  Project test philosophy was to “Break it big early.” 1              X              3              4              5 9 
V11. Component and system maturity were validated at the right 
  times in the program. 1              2              X              4              5 9 
V12.  The project and the testing community had an adversarial  
 relationship.   1             X              3               4              5              9 
V13.  Most project validation events produced quality results. 1              2              X              4              5 9 
V14.  The project didn’t recognize important lessons that validation  
  work uncovered.  1              2              X              4              5 9 
V15.  Sometimes the project settled for less than the best  
  validation method. 1              2              X              4              5 9 
 
Team Participants & Communications during Development 
Here are some statements about the people on the project during the System Development stage.  Please circle a number to 
indicate your level of agreement or disagreement that each statement is a description of team processes on this project.  
 Strongly    Disagree  Neither agree   Agree    Strongly    Don’t 
   disagree  somewhat nor disagree  Somewhat   Agree      know 
D1.  The team leader was good at resolving technical disagreements. 1              2              3              X              5 9 
X              5 9 
D3.  There was a lot of turn-over in team membership. 1              X             3              4               5 9 
X             3              4               5 9 
D5. The team leader had very high technical competence. 1              2              3              X              5 9 
X             3              4               5 9 
D7. Team meetings were sometimes frustrating and non-productive. 1              2              3              X              5 9  
X              4              5 9 
D9. Project results did not take advantage of the team’s best ideas. 1              X              3              4              5 9 
X              5 9 
D11.  There was often uncertainty about the future of project funding. 1              2              3              X              5 9 
X              3              4              5 9 
D13. Management project reviews were constructive & helpful. 1              2              X              4              5 9 
X 9 
D15. At the prime contractor, the project was a management priority.  1              2              3               4              X 9 
X              5 9 
D17. Project had a visible & supportive champion in the Prime’s management.  1                2               3                4                 X             9 
X 9 
D19. The gov’t PM was reluctant to share problems with Army leaders                 1              2             X              4              5 9 
   * By TRADOC here and elsewhere, we mean Training & Doctrine Command and/or other appropriate user representatives. 
D2.  The team leader was good at getting necessary resources.   1              2              3              
D4.  The team leader had both design & production experience. 1              
D6. Some key technical skills were not represented on the team itself. 1              
D8. Professionals were split across too many different tasks & teams. 1              2              
D10. Key members continued through pre-production planning         
and testing.  1              2              3              
D12. The team was reluctant to share concerns with gov’t PM.    1              
D14. Formal reviews were conducted at key decision points.  1              2              3               4              
D16. Usually team knew right away where to get necessary outside help. 1              2              3              
D18.There was a lot of contact with TRADOC* during the project.   1              2              3              4               
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D20. Who besides the team usually attended formal reviews? (Check all that apply.)   
 D20a. Any Prime upper management (Director or VP level)?        X _ 1. Yes     ___ 2. No    ___ 8. Not appl.  ___ 9. DK 
 D20b. Any Army Program management representatives?    _ X _ 1. Yes     ___ 2. No    ___ 8. Not appl.  ___ 9. DK 
 D20c. Any TRADOC or other user representatives? _ X _ 1. Yes     ___ 2. No    ___ 8. Not appl.  ___ 9. DK 
Activity Report during System Development Stage of Project 
How often did team members do the following during Development?             Once or   Several  Many  Don’t know, 
(If you feel the activity is Not Applicable to your project, check NA.)               Never       twice     times     times      Not appl 
F1.  Went to the shop floor to meet about related production processes. ____ ____ ____ _X _         (___) 
_X _         (___) 
F3.  Showed & discussed physical models of new components with suppliers.  ____ ____ ____ _X _         (___) 
_X _         (___) 
How often did the following occur during Development? 
F5. Did TRADOC/other user organizations show strong support? ____  ____ ____ _X _      (___)  
_X _ ____      (___)  
F7. Were there changes in system requirements (e.g., threat)? ____  ____ _X _ ____      (___)  
SHARED DESIGN-PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES during System Development.  Here only count joint meetings or 
discussions that included both DESIGN and people from PRODUCTION  
and/or from the PROGRAM  concerned with production of the System.                Once or   Several  Many  Don’t know,
How often did team members do the following during Development?    Never       twice     times     times      Not appl 
F10.  Passed around physical prototypes during joint discussions. ____ ____ _X _ ____         (___)  
_X _ ____         (___)  
F12. Explored choices together with computational models or analytic tools. ____ ____ _X _ ____         (___) 
_X _ ____         (___)  
SHARED DESIGN-SUPPLIER ACTIVITIES during System Development.  Now only count joint meetings or  
discussions that included personnel from both DESIGN and SUPPLIERS. 
How often did team members do the following during Development?        Once or   Several   Many Don’t know, 
   Never       twice     times     times      Not appl. 
F20.  Passed around physical prototypes during joint discussions. ____ ____ _X _ ____         (___)  
_X _ ____         (___)  
F22. Explored choices together with computational models or analytic tools. ____ ____ _X _ ____         (___)  
_X _ ____         (___) 
 
ACTIVITY PHASING BY STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION 
When were the following activities carried out by the team?  For example, if for W1, Production was involved regularly 
 in the Selection/Planning stage, dropped out, and then came back in late in the Development work and continued to participate
 after that, check (9) first, fourth and fifth columns. 
                                                                                                SP           D                          TP 
   Selection      Development          Transition       (DK/ 
   Please check (9  ) all stages when the activity occurred.                               Early   Middle  Later                   (Never)  NA) 
_X _ _X _ (___) (___) 
W2. When did team members meet with production on shop floor?  ____ ____ ____ _X _ _X _ (___) (___) 
_X _ _X _ _X _ _X _ _X _ (___) (___) 
W4. When was there change in key TRADOC/user representatives?   ____ _X _ ____ ____ _X _ (___) (___) 
_X _ _X _ _X _ (___) (___) 
W6. When was there change in the system requirements?  ____ _X _    ___      _X _    (___) (___) 
F2.  Asked for supplier comments & suggestions on design choices. ____ ____ ____ 
F4. Needed management help to resolve project team disagreements. ____ ____ ____ 
F6. Were there changes in key TRADOC or other user personnel?  ____ ____ 
F11.  Held planning meetings that included both design & production people.  ____ ____ 
F13. Had test articles or pre-production parts to discuss and examine jointly. ____ ____ 
F21.  Held planning meetings that included both design and suppliers.  ____ ____ 
F23. Had test articles or pre-production parts to discuss and examine jointly.  ____ ____ 
W1. When did production representatives participate regularly?  ____ ____ ____ 
W3. When was the TRADOC consulted on project questions?  
W5. When did TRADOC/other users show strong support?  ____ ____ 
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Relationship & Activities between Engineering Design & Production/Program 
These questions are different because they focus only  
on joint meetings or discussions that included both              SP           D                          TP 
DESIGN personnel and people from PRODUCTION                      Selection         Development           Transition             (DK/ 
and/or PROGRAM people concerned with production.                                 Early  Middle Later                 (Never)    NA) 
W16. When did the team & technical professionals from Production   
  have unscheduled & informal joint conversations about the project? ____ ____ ____ _X _ ____  (___)   (___) 
_X _ ____  (___)   (___) 
W18. When were prototypes and parts used in joint discussions? ____ ____ ____ _X _ ____  (___)   (___) 
 
Relationship & Activities between Engineering Design & Suppliers 
Focus only on joint meetings or discussions that                 SP           D                          TP 
 included both DESIGN personnel and SUPPLIERS:                      Selection         Development         Transition             (DK/ 
W26. When did the team & technical professionals from Suppliers                       Early  Middle Later                 (Never)   NA) 
  have unscheduled & informal joint conversations about the project? ____ ____ _X _ ____ ____    (___)   (___) 
_X _ ____ ____  (___)   (___) 
W28. When were prototypes and parts used in joint discussions? ____ ____ _X _ ____ ____   (___)   (___) 
 
Problem Solving and Team Effort 
Here are a series of statements about problems that are said to occur with technology development.  For each statement, we are 
 asking you to make two separate judgments to help us understand what problems require substantial team effort: 
n First, did this problem ever come up in the specific project being reported on?  If “No”, then circle the “0”. 
o If “Yes,”  how serious was the impact of this problem on the process of the project’s work?  Here we are concerned with 
 how much effort in attention, time and energy did the project have to spend solving or compensating for this problem. 
                     n Did this problem come up during this project? No. Yes. The problem came up. 
  o  IF YES, how much project effort 
        had to be spent on this problem? 
    Very                                                        Very 
 minor      Minor      Signif.     Major      major 
 effort       effort        effort       effort       effort 
 B1.  It was harder than expected to take the risk out of the new technology.   0    1          X          3          4          5     
X          4          5 
X          4          5 
X          3          4          5 
X          4          5 
X          3          4          5 
X          3          4          5 
X          4          5 
X          4          5 
X          3          4          5 
X          3          4          5 
X          3          4          5 
X          4          5 
   
W17. When were analytic engineering tools used jointly by Design 
  and Production to explore options together? ____ ____ ____ 
W27. When were analytic engineering tools used jointly by Design 
  and Suppliers to explore options together? ____ ____ 
 B2.  Cut-backs in project resources forced changes/compromises.   0    1          2          
 B3.  Changes in company strategies and goals hurt the project.   0    1          2          
 B4.  A critical production issue was uncovered very late in the process.   0    1          
 B5.  Management pressure pushed technology prematurely into production.   0    1          2          
 B6. There was a lack of acceptance standards for the new technology.   0    1          
 B7. The technology was hard to scale up from lab & pilot tests.   0    1          
 B8. Testing, quality control and/or acceptance took longer than planned.   0    1          2          
 B9. Departments at the prime resisted project ideas & approaches.   0    1          2          
B10. One or more suppliers did not meet their commitments.   0    1          
B11. Army Labs/Centers resisted project ideas or approaches.   0    1          
B12. Army program offices resisted project ideas or approaches.    0    1          
B13. Threat definition or other requirements changed during the project.   0    1          2          
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Project Outcomes 
 O1. Project Acceptance. Was the SYSTEM accepted to be put into Production?  This is initial acceptance, not whether it    
actually ended up in production.   
  ___  1. No, the System was abandoned.  ___  8. NA, not applicable  
 ___  2. No, but concept/technology was used later.  ___  9. DK, don’t know/can’t remember 
 _X _  3. Yes, the System was accepted for production  
O2. After the SYSTEM was accepted and was in Transition to Production, how many additional changes in the designs and 
processes were later required before the System was taken into full production?    
  ___ 1. Many serious changes   _X _ 2. Significant changes    ___3. Minor changes     ___4. No or almost no changes 
     ___  7. Did not reach production, was not implemented   ___ 8. Not Applicable   ___ 9. Don’t know 
 
O3. Did the SYSTEM go into full production?   
  ___  1. No, the System was abandoned.                    ___  8. NA, not applicable  
 ___  2. No, but concept/some technology was used later. ___  9. DK, don’t know/can’t remember 
 _X _  3. Yes, the System was put into full production. 
O4. For each of the technologies A, B, and C above, to what        O4a.                  O4b.               O4c. 
   extent was each used in the System as it was produced:  Technology A Technology B    Technology C 
   No, the technology was not used in the System. 1. ____  1. ____ 1. ____ 
   No, but the technology was used later(elsewhere) 2. ____  2. ____  2. ____  
   The technology was used but not to extent originally planned. 3. ____  3. ____  3. ____ 
    Yes, the technology was used as planned.  4. _X _ 4.  _X _  4. _X _  
    Don’t know.  9. ____ 9.  ____  9. ____  
O5. After the SYSTEM reached Transition to Production, did the project go to Production as quickly as it should have? 
 ___  1. No delay      _X _ 2. One to six months delay  ___ 3. Seven to twelve month delay    ___ 4. Over a year late 
     ___  5. Did not reach production, was not implemented  ___ 8. Not Applicable ___ 9. Don’t know 
O6. After the SYSTEM was actually in Production, how many additional changes in designs and processes were required? 
  ___ 1. Many serious changes   _X _ 2. Significant changes    ___3. Minor changes    ___4. No or almost no changes 
     ___  7. System did not reach production ___ 8. Not Applicable ___ 9. Don’t know 
O7.  Did the SYSTEM as it was implemented meet the program’s cost goals? 
  ___ 1. The results met or exceeded cost goals     ___ 7. System did not reach production. 
  _X _ 2. The results came close to achieving cost goals   ___ 8. Not applicable. 
  ___ 3. The results fell far short of achieving cost goals   ___ 9. Don’t know.  
O8.  Did the System Development program, as implemented, come in on budget? 
  ___ 1. The project met or under-ran budget.     ___ 9. Don’t know.    
  ___ 2. The project slightly exceeded budget.    
  _X _ 3. The project significantly exceeded budget.    
O9. Did the System as it was implemented meet the project’s technical goals and functional requirements? 
  _X _ 1. The results met or exceeded technical goals     ___ 7. Did not reach production, was not implemented. 
  ___ 2. The results came close to achieving technical goals   ___ 8. Not applicable. 
  ___ 3. The results fell far short of achieving technical goals   ___ 9. Don’t know.  
O9. Did the System have problems in the field under operational conditions in Desert Storm? 
  ___ 1. Yes, problems in the field significantly limited the system’s effectiveness.      
  _X _ 2. Yes, problems in the field caused minor problems in the system’s effectiveness.       ___ 9. Don’t know, question 
       ___ 3. No, the system was deployed and encountered no noticeable loss of effectiveness.     not applicable to this system.     
  ___ 4. No, the system was deployed and exceeded expectations of its effectiveness.                
        IF YOU CHECKED “1” or “2” to question O9, what did the field problems result from?  Check all that apply. 
  O9a. ___ The System did not meet its requirements. 
  O9b. _X _ Requirements did not reflect the field environment.                  O9e. ___ Other: _______________________ 
  O9c. ___ The System was not deployed in its intended role.                    (Please explain.) _______________________ 
O9d. ___ Personnel not adequately trained/prepared to use the System.   
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I1. Now that you have had a chance to think about the project and provide some answers, how well do 
you think you feel you have captured the details of the project?  Are you: (Check 9 one.) 
 _X _1. Very confident that you captured the project well? 
 ___2. Fairly confident you understand the main things well, but not as confident about the details?  
 ___3. Not confident of your information about the project, so we should only use your answers with 
caution. 
 
I2.  Finally, what was the most difficult problem the Project Manager faced, how was the problem dealt 
with, and what was the impact of the problem on the project outcome?    
  Funding Issues 
  Production Control 
 
 
Technology Readiness Level Scale 
 1. Basic principles observed and reported.  Scientific research begins to be translated into applied 
research and development concepts.  There have been paper studies of technology’s basic properties. 
 2. Technology concept and/or application formulated. Practical applications have been invented.   
Application is specu- 
 lative and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumptions. Examples are still limited 
to paper studies. 
 3. Analytical & experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept. Analytical 
and laboratory 
 studies have physically validated analytic predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative 
 4. Component and/or bread board validation in lab environment. Basic technological components 
are integrated to establish that pieces will work together, e.g., integration of ad hoc parts in lab. This 
is relatively “low fidelity” compared to the eventual system. 
 5. Components and/or bread board validation in relevant environment. Fidelity of breadboard 
technology is significantly increased. Basic components integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so the technology can be tested in a simulated environment. Examples include 
“high fidelity” laboratory integration of components. 
 6. System/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment.  Representative 
model or prototype system, which is well beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, tested in a 
relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated readiness. 
Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity laboratory environment or in a simulated 
operational environment.         
 7. System prototype demonstrated in an operational environment.  Prototype near or at  planned 
operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an actual 
system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples 
include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft. 
 8. Actual system completed and qualified in test and demonstration.  Technology proven to work in 
final form and under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of true 
system development. Examples include developmental test and evaluation in its intended weapon 
system to determine if it meets design specification. 
9. Actual system proven in successful operational environment.  Actual application of the technology in its final 
form and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and evaluation. In almost all 
cases, this is the end of the last “bug fixing” aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
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APPENDIX D:  ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAH Advanced Attack Helicopter or Apache Attack Helicopter 
AAFSS Advanced Aerial Fire Support System 
CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
CAS Close Air Support 
D Development (survey definition) 
DoD Department of Defense 
FMECA Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
FUE First Unit Equipped 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
IR&D Internal Research and Development 
MNS Mission Needs Statement 
PM Program Manager 
PMO Program Management Office 
RFP Request for Proposal 
SP System planning phase (survey definition) 
S&T Science and Technology 
TEMP Test Evaluation Master Plan 
TP Transition to Production (survey definition) 
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